Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 35
Issue 1 Fall 2003

Article 11

2003

Website Access: The Case for Consent
David McGowan
University of Minnesota Law School

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Computer Law Commons
Recommended Citation
David McGowan, Website Access: The Case for Consent, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 341 (2003).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol35/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Website Access: The Case for Consent
David McGowan*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article is about what default rule should govern access to
websites and proprietary networks connected to the Internet. 1 It argues
that the best default is a rule of consent supported by judicial
injunctions to facilitate bargaining on terms most likely to enhance net
social welfare.
Under this rule, courts should presume that a website owner who
connects a website to the Internet consents to any lawful use of the
website by any person who can access the website. Owners should be
able to rebut this presumption by notifying users that the owner does not
consent to particular uses, or consents to use subject only to certain
conditions. Notice should be fitted to the use, so that automated
browsing programs are bound only by notice they can read, while
individual users or programmers are bound only by notice they can read.
Conditions should be analyzed under general legal rules, such as
contract and antitrust. Deviations from this regime may sometimes be
warranted, but this position should be the default.
What are the other options? Instead of a rule of consent, one could
argue for a rule of mandatory access. On this view, anyone who makes
content available on the Internet joins a network in which anyone may
access anything, and the Internet is a commons. 2 The extension of this
* Associate Professor of Law and Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Law School. My thanks to Brian Bix, Dan Burk, Dan Farber, Michael Froomkin, Dan Gifford,
Eric Goldman, Trotter Hardy, Mark Lemley, Larry Lessig, Brett McDonnell, Miranda McGowan,
and Jay Monahan. Remaining mistakes are my fault.
1. By proprietary networks, I mean individual firms, such as Intel, and individual firms that
provide Internet services, such as AOL or CompuServe. The discussion therefore refers only to
the "ends" of the network and not to the addressing and transmission aspects of the network. See
Lawrence Lessig & Mark A. Lemley, The End of End-to-End: Preservingthe Architecture of the

Internet in the BroadbandEra, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 930-31 (2001) (describing "end-to-end"
architecture).
2. Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 48-49

(2000) (describing the Internet as a "commons" while proposing a nuisance rule to govern
access); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the
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premise is that no right to exclude should be recognized and all uses
should be privileged.
No one actually advocates a pure commons view, and with good
reason. Even working solely within a utilitarian model, 3 sometimes
welfare is enhanced by excluding persons from websites, as with
websites that must limit access to comply with the securities laws, or
websites that must password-protect content to charge fees necessary to
keep the site running. 4 Some uses reduce welfare, as when persons
embed pornographic images in chat rooms, 5 or when a former employee
sends an e-mail to his employer describing the sexual practices of a
current employee. 6 Because the commons view offers no justification
for any form of exclusion, it cannot distinguish among such cases.
Therefore, if implemented, the commons view would actually tend to
diminish the diversity of social experience on the Internet. The
commons view would leave all websites open for any use, meaning no
websites could be reserved for particular uses. Declaring that every
website is a speaker's corner would diminish the ability of particular
websites to be anything other than an expressive free-for-all. Websites
with more particular missions, such as classrooms or symphony halls,
would have a harder time achieving those missions if they were treated
as quads or football stadiums. 7 Variations on the commons theme are
possible. Such variations, however, tend to produce ad hoc positions
rather than arguments, and these positions do not state premises that can
justify weakening the pure commons position while stopping short of a
rule of consent.
Why consent? Following basic Coasean reasoning, 8 I argue that the
real choice in the access debate is between property rules and liability
Right to Exclude Indexing, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 165, 171 (2001) ("[T]he high hopes
raised by cyberspace for changing the information landscape require open access.").
3. I assume for purposes of this Article that utilitarianism is the relevant mode of analysis,
rather than Lockean theories of property. I do not wish to endorse that view as such, just to limit
the scope of the argument here.
4. See infra Part III (arguing that exclusion is essential to a website's social function).
5. See E-mail from Jay Monahan, Associate General Counsel, eBay.com, Inc., to David
McGowan, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School (Mar. 4, 2003) (on
file with author) (describing problems eBay has faced).
6. Cf. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 2001) (regarding suit for access
by former employee who sent e-mails complaining about employment practices to existing
employees), rev'd, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
7. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (discussing attempts to homogenize the
Internet).
8. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 153-56 (1988) [hereinafter
COASE, FIRM, MARKET AND LAW] (arguing that in the absence of transaction costs, bargaining
produces socially optimal results); R.H. COASE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF
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rules. Property rules are preferable because bargaining over access is
possible and bargaining is a surer guide to the welfare effects of access
than alternatives, such as judicial cost-benefit analysis.
Though
theoretical claims of market failure have been advanced in the access
debate, those claims are not borne out by the cases. 9 In addition to the
general arguments in favor of bargaining, I argue that judicial secondguessing of access decisions, as would occur under a liability rule,
would have undesirable effects. Such second-guessing would impair
the discretion website owners need to constitute the expressive

environments in which website users and network users, including
employees, operate. By limiting website owner discretion, judicial
oversight would tend to homogenize environments.
Part II of this Article explains the trespass to chattels doctrine, which
several courts have used to implement consent as the principle
governing website access. It argues that this doctrine does not deserve
the severe academic criticism it has received. Part III discusses how
different access rules affect the internal constitution and managerial
authority of website owners and firms connected to the Internet.
Among other things, it explains why the idea that there is a free speech
right to access websites and networks is normatively and doctrinally
wrong. Part IV takes up the general normative question of whether
access to websites and networks should be governed by a rule of
mandatory access or a rule of consent. It provides reasons for favoring
10
consent, and thus a property rule, over other competing rules.

PRODUCTION 8-9 (1991) [hereinafter COASE, STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION]. Professor Trotter
Hardy was the first to discuss the property rights implications of this intellectual tradition for the
type of problem I discuss here. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 217 [hereinafter Hardy, Property]. Professor Hardy does not discuss trespass
theory as such in this article, though he does in a later one. I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient
Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L. art. 7, at http://www.wm.edulaw/
publications/jolarticles.shtml. For the classic relation of bargaining to property rules and liability
rules, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1106 (1972). More recently,
Professor Richard Epstein has advanced views similar to the argument I make here. Richard A.
Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 76, 79 (2003).
9. See infra Parts IV.E-F (stating that traditional arguments against bargaining do not
undermine consent, which should prevail as the default rule).
10. I do not claim to prove this case conclusively. Because I assume here that utilitarianism is
the relevant mode of analysis, I argue only that there is better reason to believe that net social
welfare would be higher under a property rule than a liability rule. This conclusion is further
qualified by the concession, which utilitarianism requires, that if net welfare would be enhanced
by applying a different rule to a particular set of cases, then that is what the law should do.
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POSITIVE LAW AND NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

This Part discusses the doctrine of trespass to chattels, which courts
have used to regulate access to websites, and the academic critiques of
that use of the doctrine. 11 It argues that the doctrine has received
unjustifiably bad press in scholarly circles. 12 Courts applying the
doctrine to enjoin use of specific websites have extended it to protect an
interest the law recognizes but expects to be protected by self-help.
Injunctions in such cases achieve the results contemplated by existing
law; criticizers of injunctions implicitly maintain that the cause of
action must remain the same, even if that means the doctrine produces
different results than it did in the past.
A. JudicialAdoption of the Trespass to Chattels Tort
To Regulate Access
Section 217 of the Second Restatement of Torts ("Restatement") says
a defendant may be liable under the doctrine of trespass to chattels
either for "dispossessing another of the chattel" or for "using or
intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another."1 3 As the
disjunctive language indicates, "dispossessing" and "intermeddling" are
two different things.
Section 221 of the Restatement defines
"dispossession" to include taking a chattel from another, obtaining it by
fraud, barring the owner's access to the chattel, destroying the chattel,
or taking it into the custody of the law. 14 Comment e to section 217

11. Significant cases extending the doctrine include Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms
Processing,Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001); Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge,

Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444
(E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc., v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe Inc.
v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1028 (S.D. Ohio 1997); and Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v.

Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996).

For a case refusing to enjoin linking, see

Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10,

2000). The most important case rejecting extension of the doctrine is Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71
P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
12. The most important critique is Burk, supra note 2, at 39-54 (criticizing use of trespass
causes of action in cyberspace). For other critiques, see also Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 165
(arguing for open access on the Internet); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and
Competition on the Internet: In Search of an AppropriateAnalogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561,

566 (2001) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Analogy] (arguing that in order to define Internet property
rights the law needs a framework that is aware of competitive concerns); Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Productand Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L.

REV. 1965 (2000) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Shaping Competition] (describing the nature of
competition and property rights on the Internet).
13.
14.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965).
Id. § 221.
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defines "intermeddling" as "intentionally bringing about a physical
contact with the chattel." 5
The distinction between dispossession and intermeddling is
reinforced in section 218, the Restatement's liability provision. A
person is liable for trespass to chattels if she dispossesses another of the
chattel, impairs the condition, quality, or value of the chattel, deprives
the owner of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or causes
bodily harm to the possessor or to "some person or thing in which the
possessor has a legally protected interest." 16 Dispossession without
harm may create a basis for liability. 17 In unusual cases, so may uses
18
that neither dispossess the owner of the chattel nor harm the chattel.
The doctrine is legally significant even where it will not provide a
basis for damages. The Restatement says trespass to a chattel "may...
be important in the determination of the legal relations of the parties"
even if the trespass is "not ...actionable because it does no harm to the
19
chattel or to any other legally protected interest of the possessor."'
Most importantly, even in cases where no harm is done to a chattel, a
trespass "affords the possessor a privilege to use force to defend his
20
interest in its exclusive possession."
The Restatement links the possessor's privilege to defend her interest
in a chattel to what comment e to section 218 refers to as "[t]he interest
of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability." 2 1 That comment states
that an owner's interest in the inviolability of a chattel differs legally
from "the similar interest of a possessor of land," because the chattelowner's interest "is not given legal protection by an action for nominal
damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel. 2 2
The
Restatement takes the position that this differential treatment of
"similar" interests is justified because "[s]ufficient legal protection of
the possessor's interest in the mere inviolability of his chattel is
afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his
23
possession against even harmless interference."

15. Id. § 217 cmt. e.
16. Id. § 218.
17. Id. § 218 cmt. d.
18. Id. § 218 cmt. h. The Restatement gives the example of one who uses the toothbrush of
another. Though the use may not damage the toothbrush, the owner might reasonably feel less
keen on using the chattel again. Id.
19. Id. § 217 cmt. a.
20. Id.
21. Id. § 218 cmt. e.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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The Restatement therefore does not recognize fundamentally
different interests between owners of land and owners of chattel.
Instead, it refers to both types of owners as having a "similar" interest in
inviolable possession. 24 The Restatement does treat them differently
with respect to remedies for harmless invasion of that interest; the
landowner gets an action for nominal damages, while the chattel owner
25
gets a privilege to use self-help to stop the invasion.
The trespass to chattels doctrine became prominent in access cases
following Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek. 26 Thrifty-Tel provided longdistance telephone service. 27 The Bezeneks were the parents of two
28
teenage boys who obtained a Thrifty-Tel access code from a friend.
The boys used that code to enter the Thrifty-Tel system in an effort to
obtain an authorization code that would allow them to make free longdistance calls. 29 They failed, but on their second attempt they employed
an automated calling strategy that clogged the system and denied some
30
customers access.
Thrifty-Tel sued the boys' parents and won on the theory that the
boys had converted the access codes. 3 1 On appeal, the court worried
32
that the tort of conversion might not apply to such intangible property.
It resolved the worry by affirming liability on a trespass to chattels
theory. 3 3 The court said the tort creates liability "where an intentional
interference with the possession of personal property has proximately

24. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 77-78 (emphasizing the inviolability of a possessor's interest
under the Restatement).
25. See O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 1995. Professor Epstein suggests
the law recognizes a cause of action for harmless trespass to land but not chattels because the
cause of action is useful to settle title disputes over land. Where two parties disagree on who
owns land, it would be silly to require harm in order to bring the case to court. For chattel, the
same purpose is served by recognizing a cause of action for dispossession without regard to harm.
Epstein, supra note 8, at 78. He also suggests the Restatement recognizes a self-defense privilege
rather than a cause of action because "[n]o one in his right mind sues for nominal damages." Id.
26. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996).
27. Id. at 471.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 471-72
32. Id. at 472.
33. Id. The court said the trespass theory had been argued in the trial court, where "defense
counsel essentially conceded Ryan and Gerry trespassed, but maintained the mislabeling of the
cause of action as one for conversion was fatal." Id.
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caused injury," 34 and it held that this theory 35avoided the question of
whether intangible property may be converted.
The trespass to chattels theory found its way to Internet access cases
through CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,36 in which the
court employed this theory to enjoin Cyber Promotions from sending
bulk e-mail, or span, to CompuServe customers over CompuServe's
network. CompuServe customers paid for the time they spent on the
system, so wading through spam cost them money. 37 Many customers
complained to CompuServe about spam, and some cancelled their
subscriptions. 38 CompuServe complained to Cyber Promotions and
insisted that it stop spamming CompuServe customers, but the
CompuServe tried blocking Cyber
complaints did not work. 39
Promotions' spain, but that did not work either, n° so CompuServe sued.
The CompuServe court accepted the Thrifty-Tel holding that
electronic signals can support a trespass claim.4 1 It extended that
analysis by emphasizing the language of Restatement section 218(b),
which says liability exists where a trespass impairs the "condition,
quality, or value" of a chattel.4 2 The court thought spamming lowered
the value of CompuServe's systems because spam "demand[s] the disk
space and drain[s] the processing power of plaintiffs computer
equipment." 43 That might have been a good argument in Thrifty-Tel,
where some customers were actually blocked out of the system, 4 4 but
the evidence in CompuServe showed only that the defendant's spain
placed a "tremendous burden" on the system.4 5 There was no evidence
that the system could not bear that burden. There was no evidence that
the plaintiff's servers crashed, that it ran out of disk space, or that its

34. Id. at 473.
35. The court drew an analogy to trespass to land cases holding that trespass could be
established by proving that a defendant caused intangible phenomena such as dust, sound waves,
smoke, and vibrations to affect a plaintiff's land, even if the plaintiff was not put off the land or
prevented from using it. In light of these cases, the court said, "the electronic signals generated
by the Bezenek boys' activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action."
Id. at 473 n.6 (collecting cases).
36. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
37. Id. at 1019.
38. Id. at 1023.
39. Id. at 1024.
40. Id. at 1019.
41. Id. at 1021.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1022.
44. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 471 (Ct. App. 1996).
45. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022.
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customers were actually blocked out of the system. 46 The court's
endorsement of the trespass to chattels cause of action was therefore

equivalent to finding that use of the system was actionable if it caused
economic losses to the business the system ran.
The court also stressed that under Restatement section 218(d), a
person may be liable for trespass that causes harm "to some person or
thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest." 47 Noting

that in November 1996 CompuServe received almost 10,000 customer
complaints about spam and received each day about fifty complaints
pertaining to Cyber Promotions, the court concluded that harm to
CompuServe's business reputation and goodwill could support a claim
for trespass to chattels. 4 8 Finally, the court rejected Cyber Promotions'
claim that the tort requires plaintiffs to show that the "'alleged
trespasser actually takes physical custody of the property or physically
damages it."' 49 The court rightly said "[i]t is clear from a reading of
Restatement section 218 that an interference or intermeddling that does
not fit the section 221 definition of 'dispossession' can nonetheless
50
result in defendants' liability for trespass."

In this regard, the court found significant the owner's privilege to use
self-help to stop even harmless intermeddling. 5 1 The court interpreted
this privilege to authorize CompuServe's efforts to block Cyber
Promotions' spam. Those efforts failed because of Cyber Promotions'

countermeasures. The court saw its injunction as remedying the failure
of the self-help privilege, which the Restatement expected would be
"sufficient" to protect the owner's interest in inviolable possession. 52

46. Even the decision of the California Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, which tends
to emphasize the burden of spai in previous cases in order to distinguish them from its rejection
of the trespass to chattels tort in this context, claims only that, in CompuServe, the defendant's
spam created "some interference with the efficient functioning of [CompuServe's] computer
system." Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 304 (Cal. 2003) (emphasis added). The court made
no effort to explain what it meant by efficient, nor why inefficiency should count as harm under
its reasoning. As discussed below, this type of reasoning creates perverse incentives for firms:
the more costs they sink to develop capacity, the fewer rights they have. See infra text
accompanying note 162 (arguing that the belief that only crashing is harm allows firms with high
costs weaker rights than firms with low costs).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218(d) (1965).
48. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023.
49. Id. at 1022 (citation omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1023; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e; supra notes 21-23
and accompanying text (justifying self-help privilege as provided by the Restatement).
52. CompuServe, 962 F.Supp. at 1023. Indeed, the court said "technological means of selfhelp, to the extent that reasonable measures are effective, [are] particularly appropriate in this
type of situation and should be exhausted before legal action is proper." Id.
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CompuServe may be read as taking into account all the economic
costs of the defendant's use, regardless of whether those costs were
accompanied by physical harm or dispossession, which the Restatement
seems to assume would go together. Such comprehensive accounting is
what utilitarian analysis demands. On this view, the case did not extend
the trespass to chattels cause of action but only applied it to a type of
harm not present in earlier cases. One might disagree with this view, of
course, and, opting for formalism over utilitarianism, insist that only
physical harm should support a theory of recovery under trespass to
chattels. Even on that view, however, the court only extended the cause
of action to compensate for the failure of self-help. 53 The court did not
invent a new legal interest.
CompuServe went some way toward establishing owner consent as
the basis for regulating website access. The facts did not present
squarely the question of whether a website owner could deny access in
the absence of even indirect economic harm. That bridge was crossed
54
in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.
eBay is an Internet auction site. 55 Bidder's Edge ran a site that
aggregated bids for similar items at different auction sites and posted
comparative bid prices. 56 Bidder's Edge did not run auctions itself, but
its users could see what an item was going for on various sites and pick
the cheapest auction to bid on. 5 7 To run its site, Bidder's Edge needed
to obtain information on eBay's auctions. 58 Bidder's Edge asked and
received permission to obtain such data from certain auctions. 59 It later
asked and received permission to expand the number of auctions it
covered. 6° Both parties expected they would agree on terms for a
licensing agreement for Bidder's Edge's queries and its use of data
61
pertaining to auctions held on eBay.

53. Id. The court also rejected Cyber Promotions' claim that the Internet is a social domain
based on open access and that, by connecting to it, CompuServe irrevocably consented to the
open access norm. The court agreed as a default matter that connecting to the Internet amounted
to "at least a tacit invitation for anyone on the Internet to utilize plaintiff's computer equipment to
send e-mail to its subscribers." Id. at 1023-24. The court was not willing to let this tacit consent
trump CompuServe's explicit demand that Cyber Promotions stop the spamming, however. Id. at
1024.
54. eBay, Inc. v. Bidders Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
55. Id. at 1060.
56. Id. at 1061.
57. Id. at 1061-62.
58. Id. at 1062.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

350
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eBay wanted Bidder's Edge to query the eBay site only when a
Bidder's Edge user queried its site. 62 eBay felt this limitation would
reduce the load on its system and increase the accuracy of the data
Bidder's Edge posted. 6 3 Bidder's Edge wanted to query eBay's system
on a recurring basis using programs known as robots. 64 This procedure
would allow Bidder's Edge to compile its own auction database,
comprised partly of data copied from eBay, which would allow it to
respond to queries faster than if it browsed eBay only when a user
submitted a query. 65 Recursive robot searches also would allow
Bidder's Edge to track auctions generally and update its users when
66
auction activity warranted.
When negotiations broke down, the parties began a game of cat and
mouse. 67 eBay attempted to identify the IP addresses Bidder's Edge
used to query the eBay site, blocking 169 such addresses, while
Bidder's Edge used proxy servers on a rotating basis to obtain data
concerning eBay auctions. 6 8 Its self-help measures having failed, eBay
sued, arguing that it "expended considerable time, effort and money to
create its computer system, and that [Bidder's Edge] should have to pay
69
for the portion of eBay's system [Bidder's Edge] uses."
The district court enjoined Bidder's Edge on a trespass to chattels
theory. 70 The court speculated that eBay might suffer harm if it were
open to all browsers, 7 1 but this speculation was unpersuasive and had
little to do with Bidder's Edge. Unlike Thrifty-Tel, there was no
evidence that Bidder's Edge's browsing obstructed user access to
eBay's system or slowed system performance. 72 Unlike CompuServe,

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1060-62. A robot is "a computer program which operates across the Internet to
perform searching, copying and retrieving functions on the web sites of others." Id. at 1060.
Robots can execute "thousands of instructions per minute." Id. at 1060-61.
65. Id. at 1062.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1062-63.
68. Id. Bidder's Edge was keen on this game because eBay was important to its business.
Sixty-nine percent of the auction items listed on Bidder's Edge were from eBay auctions, id. at
1063, and Bidder's Edge claimed that denial of "access to eBay's database [would] result in a
two-thirds decrease in the items listed on [Bidder's Edge], and a one-eighth reduction in the value
of [Bidder's Edge], from $80 million to $70 million," id. at 1068.
69. Id. at 1065.
70. Id. at 1067, 1073. eBay alleged theories of harm to its business reputation, but it did not
propose injunctive remedies tailored to that alleged harm. Id. at 1064. The court therefore did
not consider reputational harm in deciding to enjoin Bidder's Edge. Id.
71. Id. at 1066 & n.15.
72. Id. at 1065.
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there was no evidence that these queries cost eBay users money or
eroded eBay's goodwill.7 3 Further, there was no evidence of even
74
indirect harm from Bidder's Edge's actions, and the court found none.
eBay is about use, not harm. 7 5 The court said eBay had a
"fundamental property right to exclude others from its computer
system." 76 eBay worried that, unless enjoined, Bidder's Edge might
violate this right without penalty because its queries probably would
never amount to a conversion of eBay's system. 77 The court enjoined
Bidder's Edge on the ground that eBay was likely to prove that Bidder's
Edge's queries "have diminished the quality or value of eBay's
computer systems" because these queries deprived eBay of the use of a
portion of its capacity and "[t]he law recognizes no such right to use
78
another's personal property."
Though the court's speculation about harm detracts significantly from
the normative force of the opinion, Judge Whyte was right to enjoin
Bidder's Edge. Because the Restatement does recognize an interest in
the inviolable possession of chattel, the court was right to say the law
gave Bidder's Edge no right to query eBay's servers. Judge Whyte
therefore could have rested his opinion on the same ground as the
CompuServe court: his injunction protected eBay's interest "in the mere
80
inviolability of [its] chattel ' 79 when its self-defense efforts failed.
In economic terms, Judge Whyte favored the injunction, a property
rule, because it forced the parties to bargain. Property rules left the
parties freer to negotiate than they would have been under a nuisance
theory of liability which, unlike injunctions, permits a court to

73. Id.
74. Id. The court did not accept eBay's claim that Bidder's Edge should pay eBay's operating
costs in proportion to the amount of server capacity Bidder's Edge used. Id.
75. See Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 WL
1736382, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001) ("eBay. . . concluded that the defendant's conduct was
sufficient to establish a cause of action for trespass not because the interference was 'substantial'
but simply because the defendant's conduct amounted to 'use' of Plaintiff's computer." (quoting
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070)).
76. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1067.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1071. The court then reiterated the conjecture that if it declared eBay open to nonconsensual searches by auction aggregators, then many aggregators might get in the game, eBay's
system might become overloaded, and it might suffer irreparable harm. Id. at 1071-72.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 218 cmt. e (1965); see also supra notes 20-23, 51
and accompanying text (discussing self-help privilege and inviolability of owner's interest in
chattel).

80. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 n.9 ("eBay's motion appears to be, in part, a tactical
effort to increase the strength of its license negotiating position and not just a genuine effort to
prevent irreparable harm.").
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second-guess the parties' estimates of the costs and benefits of different
uses. A contrary decision might have let Bidder's Edge free ride on
eBay's investment, subject to a duty to pay damages for physical harm.
At a minimum, it would have made litigation risk relevant to
bargaining, which would lessen the degree to which bargaining
reflected the parties' estimates of the costs and benefits of the use at
stake.
eBay was part of a trend of cases extending the trespass to chattels
tort to deal with unwanted uses of websites and proprietary networks.
To date, most courts presented with such cases have accepted the
trespass tort.8 1 Many of these are federal cases, however, in which
federal judges interpret state law. 82 State courts remain free to reject
this extension of the trespass tort, which the Supreme Court of
83
California did in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi.
Hamidi was a former Intel employee who obtained a list of Intel email addresses and, over a twenty-one-month period, sent six mass emails to thousands of Intel employees. The e-mails criticized Intel's
employment practices generally, warned current employees that they
were at risk from the practices, and suggested that current employees
look for other jobs. 84 Intel sued to enjoin Hamidi's mass e-mailing on
trespass to chattel and nuisance theories. After Intel dropped the
nuisance theory, the trial court issued an injunction on the trespass
theory. 8 5 The court of appeals affirmed the injunction, which the
Supreme Court of California reversed.
The state supreme court held the trespass to chattels tort did not apply
in its current form to Intel's claim because Intel alleged harm to its
86
workers' morale and productivity rather than harm to its computers.
In the court's view, the trespass tort could only be brought to redress
"an injury to the company's interest in its computers." 87 The court

81. In addition to the cases discussed above, see cases cited supra note 11, which also
extended the doctrine of trespass to chattels.
82. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-72; Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451
(E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe
Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
83. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003).
84. Id. at 301.
85. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 247 (Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 71 P.3d 296
(Cal. 2003).
86. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 300.
87. Id.; see also id. at 306-07 ("That Hamidi's messages temporarily used some portion of the
Intel computers' processors or storage is, therefore, not enough; Intel must, but does not,
demonstrate some measurable loss from the use of its computer system.").

2003]

Website Access: The Case for Consent

distinguished cases extending the trespass tort on the ground that, in
those cases, the use at issue either interfered, "or threatened [to
interfere] with the intended functioning of the system, as by
88
significantly reducing its available memory and processing power."
The court further distinguished eBay's statement that the law recognizes
no right to use another's property 89 by saying, "[w]hile one may have
no right temporarily to use another's personal property, such use is
actionable as a trespass only if it 'has proximately caused injury' to the
90
property in question.
The court declined to extend current trespass doctrine on the ground
that there was a debate about how best to govern access to servers
connected to the Internet and the court was not in the best position to
resolve that debate. The court noted that some academics, such as
Professor Richard Epstein, argued that extending the tort would
91
facilitate bargaining that would produce the socially optimal result.
Others, such as Professors Mark Lemley, Dan Hunter, and Lawrence
Lessig, predicted that extending the tort would seriously diminish the
social value of the Internet. 9 2 In light of this debate, the court thought it
93
would be rash for it to adopt a "rigid" or "absolute" property rule.
Hamidi acknowledges that server owners have an interest in the
inviolable possession of their equipment, that self-help may be
inadequate to defend that interest, and that no one else has a legal right
to use the equipment without the owner's consent. However, Hamidi
holds that the owner has no cause of action to stop unwanted use unless
that use harms the equipment itself, rather than the owner's business.
Like the academic critique it partly embraces, the Hamidi opinion is
highly formal. I examine the doctrinal aspect of that critique in the next
section. I examine the empirical predictions of that critique in Part IV.
B. Academic Criticism of the Doctrine
Many law professors, most prominently Professor Dan Burk, oppose
decisions extending the trespass to chattels theory to website and
network access cases. They object in particular to the injunctions the

88.

Id. at 306.

89. See supra note 78 (citing the court's statement that "the law recognizes no such fight to
use another's personal property").
90. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 306 (quoting Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473
(Ct. App. 1996)).
91.

Id.

92. Id. at 310-11.
93. Id. at 311.
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theory supports. 94 In an article that has proved prescient in many ways,
Professor Burk argues that judicial use of the trespass to chattels theory
in access cases has been unprecedented, unjustified, and undesirable.
95
He favors using the nuisance tort to deal with such cases.
Writing after Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe, but before eBay and
Hamidi, Professor Burk said the former cases "recognize a novel
proprietary interest for which the label 'trespass to chattels' is merely a
convenient apology." 96 He criticized this interest as "a new form of
intellectual property, with only the most tenuous of antecedents in the
law of chattels," and noted that cyberspace trespass actions are
"particularly ill-suited to a medium that draws its unique benefits from
97
shared resources."
More particularly, Professor Burk argued that Thrifty-Tel extended
the trespass tort "without any serious analysis" 9 8 by "blithely gloss[ing]
over" 99 the distinction between trespass to land and trespass to chattels.
Similarly, he believes CompuServe "glibly intermingles trespass to
chattels with doctrines related to real property."' 10 0 Professor Burk
believes that, though trespass to chattels and trespass to land "may share
a common history, and even a common name," it is a mistake to
10 1
conflate them because "they secure entirely different interests."
Citing Dean Prosser, Professor Burk describes trespass to chattels as
a weaker version of the conversion tort rather than a variation of the tort
of trespass to land. 10 2 In Professor Burk's view, the "gravamen of
both" conversion and trespass to chattels "lies in the dispossession of
the property from its owner. In conversion, the dispossession is total; in
trespass to chattels, the dispossession is only partial."' 1 3 Thus,

94. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc. at 2-3, eBay v. Bidder's
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-15995), available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/amicus/biddersedge-v-ebay.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2003).
95. Burk, supra note 2, at 53 ("[N]uisance would authorize computer owners to legally
'defect' from the network when necessary to avoid wasteful negative externalities, but require
them to remain legally networked when necessary to generate beneficial positive network
externalities.").
96. Id. at 28 (setting the foundation for his argument).
97. Id.

98. Id. at 29.
99.

Id. at 33.

100. Id.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 33 & n.53.
Id.
Id.
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Professor Burk contends, neither tort "entails the interest in inviolability
that attends trespass to land." 10 4
For these reasons, Professor Burk charges that the courts in ThriftyTel and CompuServe "essentially reversed several hundred years of
legal evolution" by "collapsing the separate doctrines of trespass to land
and trespass to chattels," thereby effectively creating "a brand new
cause of action, unknown to modem jurisprudence."' 10 5 Other scholars,
10 6
notably Professor Maureen O'Rourke, have offered related criticism.
These cases do not deserve such condemnation. The Restatement
makes clear that "dispossession" and "intermeddling" are alternative
theories of recovery, 10 7 and that liability even for intermeddling may
rest on harm "to some person or thing in which the possessor has a
legally protected interest.' 108
The CompuServe decision rested
explicitly on this analysis, rejecting the proposition that "dispossession"
is required to sustain the tort. 10 9 Its rejection is consistent with the
language of Restatement section 217.
More fundamentally, the premise that current law recognizes no
interest in the inviolable possession of chattels is not true. It is true that
the Restatement provides an action for nominal damages for harmless
intermeddling with land but not for harmless intermeddling with
chattel. 11° It is also true, however, that the Restatement states that
chattel owners have an interest in the inviolable possession of chattel,
which it believes enjoys "sufficient" protection through the privilege to

104. Id.
105. Id.; see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction
between trespass to land and trespass to chattels in the Restatement). These arguments are echoed
in an amicus brief filed in eBay by twenty-eight law professors, who wrote in part that Judge
Whyte's analysis in eBay "relies on a principle of 'inviolability' of property that has never been
the rule for personal property and certainly not for information." Brief of Amici Curiae in
Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc., supra note 94, at 18. The opening brief for Ken Hamidi in
Hamidi makes the same argument, as do amici in the case. Opening Brief on the Merits at 2, Intel
Corp. v. Hamidi,71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (No. 98-AS-05067), available at 2002 WL 1926521.
106. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 1995-97.
107. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (differentiating between disposition and
intermeddling, and stressing their independent bases for liability for trespass to chattels).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218(d) (1965); see also supra note 47 and
accompanying text (stressing that the chattel itself need not be harmed to sustain a trespass to
chattels cause of action).
109. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
110. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (accounting for disparate treatment of
trespass to land and legal protection afforded each: a landowner may sue for nominal damages
whereas a chattel owner may resort to self-help to protect her possession).
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use reasonable force "'to protect his possession against even harmless
111
interference."'
The problem these cases present is that technology has undermined
this expectation. In the cases following Thrifty-Tel, defendants used
technical means to defeat the owner's self-help measures; self-help

therefore was not "sufficient" to protect the plaintiffs' legal interest.

112

If it had been sufficient-if CompuServe and eBay had succeeded in
blocking input from Cyber Promotions or queries from Bidder's Edgethen Cyber Promotions or Bidder's Edge could have gained access to
the websites only by obtaining the plaintiffs' consent. The injunctions
in CompuServe and eBay forced the defendants to try to obtain the
plaintiffs' consent for their uses. Those injunctions therefore actually
mimic the results noted in the Restatement when it said self-help would
be "sufficient" to protect an owner's interest in the inviolable
possession of chattel.
Apart from Hamidi, which is willing to divide an owner's entitlement
from a legal remedy for violation of that entitlement, the cases extend
the doctrine to compensate for the failure of self-help, but they do not
alter the real-world results that would occur if, as the Restatement
contemplates, self-help worked. For these reasons, courts should not be
condemned
for
wrongly
conflating
trespass
to
chattels
113
and trespass to lands.
The torts actually do protect comparable
11. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218
cmt. e). Comment e refers to section 77 of the Restatement, which falls under the topic heading
"Defense of Actor's Interest in His Exclusive Possession of Land and Chattels." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 77 cmt. a. Comment a to section 77 says that "the use of force to prevent
or terminate even a harmless intermeddling with a chattel is privileged," id., and that section 80 of
the Restatement "states a similar rule as to putting another in apprehension of a harmful or
offensive contact and imposing a confinement upon another for the purpose of protecting the
actor's exclusive possession of land or chattels," id., which is indeed what section 80 does. These
sections do not distinguish between the privilege to defend land and the privilege to defend
chattels. See id. §§ 77, 80.
112. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 301 (Cal. 2003) ("Intel's attempt to block
internal transmission of the messages succeeded only in part; Hamidi later admitted he evaded
blocking efforts by using different sending computers."); see also, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062-63 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (describing defendant's use of proxy
servers to evade plaintiff's blocking efforts); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d
444, 448 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citing admission in discovery that defendant tried to evade AOL antispam filters); CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1017 ("CompuServe has attempted to employ
technological means to block the flow of defendants' e-mail transmissions to its computer
equipment, but to no avail.").
113. In any event, in the type of case at issue here, trespass to land doctrine began converging
with nuisance doctrine long ago. See Bradley v. Am. Smelting and Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 786
(Wash. 1985) (stating that "little of substance remains to any distinction between" trespass and
nuisance "when air pollution is involved"). Convergence in doctrines traces at least to Martin v.
Reynolds Metal Co., which affirmed liability for dispersion of fluoride compounds that rendered
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interests.I l4
The only difference relevant here is that the law
traditionally protected harmless invasions of chattels by giving owners a
privilege to use self-help rather than by giving them a cause of action,
which owners of land did have.
Finally, Professors Burk and O'Rourke have suggested that copyright
law may preempt the trespass tort, and that it at least balances incentives
to create and distribute information that courts should not disturb by
extending the trespass tort. 115 The tort is not preempted. Spam cases,
in which users attempt to send or "push" data through a network, or
place data on a website, 1 16 do not resemble copyright cases. Even in
"pull" cases, where a user copies data from a website with an eye
toward distributing it or making it available to others, trespass doctrine
forbids use without regard to copying or distribution, while the
Copyright Act forbids copying and distribution even where use of a
particular copy is lawful. 117 Because the Copyright Act has an express
preemption provision, 118 I would hesitate to endorse penumbral
preemption of the trespass tort. As a general matter, it is fair to counter
the move of classifying all sites abstractly as databases, and thus beyond
copyright's protection, 1 9 by treating the trespass tort abstractly as well.
More substantively, websites do not function socially as phone
books. They play varied and dynamic social roles, the success of which
land unfit for raising cattle. Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959).
Bradley maintained the distinction somewhat arbitrarily by holding that if particles did not
accumulate, then a plaintiff could sue only for nuisance; accumulation constituted trespass.
Bradley, 709 P.2d at 791. The court modified trespass doctrine in such cases, requiring that the
plaintiff show harm, but it did so largely because of worries over transaction costs. See id.; infra
note 187 (discussing the Bradley court's conversion of the property rule of trespass into a liability
rule).
114. See Poff v. Hayes, 763 So. 2d 234, 240 (Ala. 2000) ("Trespass to real property is similar
to trespass to chattels in that trespass, generally, 'is a wrong against the right of possession'."
(quoting Jeffries v. Bush, 608 So. 2d 361, 362 (Ala. 1992))).
115. Burk, supra note 2, at 35 (arguing that the tort creates a new IP fight of inviolability);
O'Rourke, Analogy, supra note 12, at 590, 592 (raising preemption and policy concerns).
116. E.g., Am. Online, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 452-53 (enjoining spammer on trespass to chattels
theory); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998) (enjoining spammer
on trespass to chattels theory); CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1028 (enjoining an advertising
company from sending spain based on tresspass to chattels theory); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114
Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 2001) (involving a suit to enjoin a former employee who sent e-mails
complaining about employment practices to existing employees), rev'd, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003);
Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding liability based on tresspass
to chattels theory). On the distinction generally, see O'Rourke, Analogy, supra note 12, at 569.
117. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
119. The Copyright Act will not protect facts or information; it will only protect databases if
the compiler's particular organization or arrangement falls within its scope. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-51 (1991).
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may depend on the right to exclude. For example, website owners are
likely to have contracts with the people a user would like to reach by
sending content through the owner's website, as in CompuServe or
Hamidi. It is therefore relatively easy for recipients, website owners,
and users to internalize social costs and benefits through contracting.
The utilitarian argument for judges or other officials to engage in costbenefit analysis of their own in such "push" cases is therefore relatively
weak.
In some cases, users who copy and distribute data, thus "pulling" it
from websites, may generate positive effects that are harder to capture
through contracting. One might argue that this was the case in eBay,
though so long as Bidder's Edge was free to charge for information on
its website it is fair to question the degree to which its benefits could not
be internalized. Still, to the extent distribution of information generates
positive externalities that could not be captured through contracting, the
policy argument for preempting the trespass tort in some "pull" cases
120
may have greater appeal than in "push" cases.
C. Why Normative Analysis Is Needed
As the discussion in Part II.A shows, before CompuServe, the
trespass to chattels doctrine had not been extended to create a right of
action for harmless intermeddling. Before CompuServe, however,
courts had not had to deal with the prospect of one firm running its
business and profiting from another firm's investment, without the
consent of that firm, but also without harming the physical
manifestation of those costs-the network. When faced with a case in
which the use did not at least clog the network for a time, as in ThriftyTel, a court would either have to change the doctrine or allow a change
in the results that doctrine produced. The court in CompuServe chose
the former result; the court in Hamidi chose the latter.
Common law courts have the power to adapt doctrine to new
circumstances. 12 1 The preceding discussion shows that, at worst, judges
who have extended the trespass tort to cases in which the use at issue
did not harm a computer have done so in a plausible way that vindicates
an interest the law already recognizes. That is a useful point, if for no
other reason than to be fair to the judges, but it does not show that these

120. See infra Part IV.E (noting that there may be positive effects that parties cannot
internalize in data harvesting cases); see also infra Part IV.G (stressing the need to distinguish
between instances of data pushing and data pulling).
121. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 5 (1988); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 12-13, 293 (1960).
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courts got it right. The real issue is normative: Should access to
websites and networks be governed by consent or some form of
mandatory access? By a property rule or a liability rule?
In addressing this normative question, academic criticism of trespass
should deal more openly with the Restatement's explicit recognition of
an interest in the inviolable possession of chattels. The right to an
injunction should align with the underlying legal interest. If the law is
right to recognize an interest in the inviolable possession of chattel, then
courts should enjoin unwanted use, unless some more specific policy
trumps the general right. Otherwise the interest varies with the owner's
physical strength or, on the Internet, with the cleverness of the owner's
counter-hackers.
Such characteristics are not relevant to the policies justifying the
recognition of, or a refusal to recognize, a right to exclude. They
therefore should not affect the decision of whether to enjoin unwanted
use. If the law is incorrect in recognizing such an interest, then the
owner should have no privilege to use force to defend it. Instead, the
owner should be enjoined from self-help to give users easier access to
the website.
Either way, no social purpose is served by what the court of appeals
in Hamidi rightly called a pointless and "wasteful cat-and-mouse game"
of self-help and countermeasure. 122 There is no principled basis for the
supreme court's decision in Hamidi to sever an owner's interest in
inviolable possession, and the corresponding absence of a user's right to
use the owner's hardware, both of which the court acknowledged, from
a cause of action that would give effect to these principles. Here, as in
the law generally, a right without a remedy is hollow. 12 3 The court's
rather formal approach is inconsistent with the common law tradition of
accommodating legal principles to changing circumstances. 124

122. Cf. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 249 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Hamidi
acknowledges Intel's right to self help and urges Intel could take further steps to fend off his emails. He has shown he will try to evade Intel's security. We conceive of no public benefit from
this wasteful cat-and-mouse game which justifies depriving Intel of an injunction."), rev'd, 71
P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
123. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY 215 (1998); JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER 4 (2002) ("A right without a remedy is a
strange animal, as strange in the legal world as a dog without a bark and without a bite in the
zoological world."); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 667-81 (1987) (explaining
the importance of remedies in defining rights).
124. EISENBERG, supra note 121, at 5 ("If the courts are to explicate the application, meaning,
and implications of the society's existing standards in new situations, they cannot simultaneously
be prohibited from formulating rules that have not previously been announced.").
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This analysis says only that the cause of action and the legal interests
should align. It does not say which way they should align. In the next
section I explain why the alignment should vindicate an owner's interest
in inviolable possession: why CompuServe is right, and Hamidi is
wrong.
III. EXCLUSION AND THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF
WEBSITES AND NETWORKS

Rights to exclude or eject others from property may be used to
bargain with others to amortize the cost of maintaining a place or a
chattel, but that is not all they do. Every space frequented by people is
instrumentally related to some end. The right to exclude gives
managers the legal power to enforce these instrumental relations by
excluding persons whose conduct conflicts with the instrumental
relations that define the social function of the space. 12 5 The right to
exclude therefore plays a vital role in constituting the social function of
different spaces.
For example, classrooms are for instruction, not chatter. Students
who persist in chattering may be expelled from the classroom because
their conduct conflicts with the end to which the social space of the
classroom is devoted. They may carry on their chosen activity in a
social space devoted to it. They might chatter in a coffee house, but not
in the classroom. That is not what it is for. If chattering could not be
excluded from a classroom, then, over time, chatter would become one
of the things the classroom was for, and the instructional function of the
126
social space of the classroom would suffer.
The same points are true of computer hardware and the Internet. A
server is no more inherently one thing or another than a marble building
with columns is inherently a courthouse or a museum. It may become a
newspaper, a website for investing in securities, a website for hosting email, or all of these things at once. As with any other social space,
however, what the website becomes will be defined in part by who may

125. This point holds even for spaces devoted to letting people do virtually whatever they
want, as with Speakers' Corner. That is simply a particular kind of instrumental relationship. See
Speakers' Corner, at http://www.speakerscorner.net/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2003) (exemplifying the
notion of designated spaces by allowing people to do virtually whatever they want, and
reinforcing a particular kind of instrumental relationship).
126. By "classroom" I do not mean any particular physical location with any particular
physical characteristic. Indeed, the same physical space could be a "classroom" at some times
and a "playroom" at others. But whatever it is, at the time in question it is that and not something
else because some person who controls the space establishes the instrumental relationship and
excludes persons whose conduct conflicts with it.
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use it and for what ends, which is to say it will be defined in part by the
right to exclude.
Sometimes strict exclusion is necessary for social interaction to occur
at all. Internet securities offerings illustrate this point. Several years
ago, some firms wanted to make available on the Internet sales
127
presentations (called "roadshows") for registered public offerings.
They worried that, if the presentations were "broadcast" generally, they
might violate section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.128 Other firms
were interested in transactions exempt from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act. 129 If the issuer or its agents engage
130
in "general solicitation," the transactions will lose their exemption.
Both types of firms dealt with these risks by limiting investor access
131
through investor verification and password protection measures.
If websites like these had to be open to the public, that fact alone
would defeat their purpose. Connecting to the Internet still lowers

transaction costs for issuers and investors. However, connecting to the
Internet lowers the cost of capital and makes financial markets more
efficient. 13 2 Websites like these are no less socially useful because they

127. See Net Roadshows, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,367, at 77,849 (Sept. 8, 1997), available at 1997 WL 555935; cf Wit Capital
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,577, at
78,906 (July 14, 1999) (seeking assurances that the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") will refrain from enforcement action where investors participate in public offerings of
securities through the Internet), availableat 1999 WL 498545.
128. Technically, the roadshow might be a "broadcast" that would count as a prospectus under
section 2(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Act") but which would not comply with section
10 of the Act, thus violating section 5(b)(1) of the Act. Id.
129. See IPONet, SEC No-Action Letter, [1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,252, at 77,271 (July 26, 1996), availableat 1996 WL 431821.
130. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505-506 (2003) (requiring compliance with rule 502(c) of the
SEC's Regulation D (17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)), which prohibits general solicitation, in order to
benefit from the registration exemption safe harbors under rules 505 and 506); Lamp
Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,453, at 78,330 (May 29, 1998) (stating that, without proper restrictions, the posting of
private offering materials on a website would constitute a general solicitation and would violate
rule 502(c) of the SEC's Regulation D), available at 1998 WL 278984.
131. Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 78,908-09; Net Roadshows, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 77,849-50; IPONet, SEC No-Action Letter, [1996 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 77,272-73.
132. See generallyTamar Frankel, The Internet, Securities Regulation, and the Theory of Law,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1319, 1341-43 (1998) (noting lower information costs and corresponding
increase in liquidity due to Internet technology); Lynn A. Stout, Technology, TransactionCosts,
and Investor Welfare: Is a Motley Fool Born Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791, 807 (1997)
(recognizing that technology has lowered transaction costs for secondary trading but that this is
bad as it decreases investor welfare).
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are exclusive; they are socially useful precisely because they are
exclusive.

Even websites that do not face such legal constraints may wish to
exclude some users. A firm sponsoring a chat room may wish to bar

offensive expression or images from the chat room. An auction website
may choose not to host auctions for artifacts of the Nazi regime or
slavery. Such choices define the practices that constitute the social

function and significance of the website. When users know they are
going to a chat room that bars racist speech, 133 that fact is an important
element of what it is that the users are doing by going there rather than a
chat room devoted to racist speech. 134 America Online ("AOL") posts
an extensive set of "web chat rules and etiquette," covering topics like
offensive expression, threats, and topicality, to enforce precisely this
point. 135 As in physical space, the right to exclude gives effect to such
choices.
If society chooses not to recognize such a right, then website owners
will be less able to define such communities. When all spaces are fair

game for everything in general, no spaces are for anything in particular.
That might look like diversity at first glance, but it is not any more 1than
36 I
would be the case if every space on a campus functioned as a quad.
doubt that any rule would truly homogenize the Internet, 137 but treating
probably lessen the diversity of
the Internet as a true commons would
138
social experience on the Internet.

133.

See Joey Gardiner, AOL Accused of Failing To Halt Racial Slander, SILICON.COM, at

http://www.silicon.com/news/500016/l/1026988.html (Aug. 31, 2001) (reporting that AOL runs
14,000 chat rooms and has "zero tolerance" for racist speech).
134. See, e.g., Official Website of the Alabama White Knights of the KuKluxKlan, at
http://www.kukluxklan.net (last visited Sept. 12, 2003) (dedicating site to Ku Klux Klan
materials).
135. See AM. ONLINE, INC., AOL INSTANT MESSENGER WEB CHAT RULES & ETIQUETrE, at
http://www.aol.com/community/rules.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2003) (containing list of web
chat rules and etiquette).
136. See David F. McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University

Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REv. 825, 911-17 (1991) (discussing different
expressive environments within universities).
137. I concede that website owners might still attempt to devote sites to particular purposes,
but there will always be a risk of encountering something inconsistent with what the site is for, as
in the case of pornography in the eBay chatroom. That risk alone would affect the way users
orient themselves toward the site. It would be as if one chose to go to a tearoom but worried that
a barroom discussion would erupt in the middle of tea. If one wanted bar talk, one would have
gone to the bar. Some diversity might survive, but the risk introduced by the open access regime
would, like any other form of risk, lessen the value of sites that tried to preserve it.
138. Members of the commons could agree among themselves to respect such rights, but that
process would be relatively costly, if it worked at all.
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For this reason, the risks and costs of error are greater for a rule of
mandatory access than for a rule conditioning access on consent. Firms
that have the right to exclude, but do not need it, need not use it. Firms
that need it but do not have it are out of luck. 139 No one is stopping any
firm from creating a spam-friendly service for users who like spam. But
if we are to have some such networks, and some spam-free networks,
and thus competition between them, then firms like CompuServe must
have the right to exclude spammers.
These same points apply to the internal operations of firms as well as
websites. The legal question is how to treat a firm's choice to connect
its internal communications network to the Internet. Hamidi presented
this problem. Intel depicted Hamidi as a disgruntled employee willing
to lie to advance his interests. 140 Hamidi's e-mails made arguably
incendiary factual assertions to current employees, such as "If you are
on redeployment, it is highly likely that you are targeted for termination
and there will not be any jobs available for you."' 14 1 The California
Supreme Court said many employees asked Intel to block further
messages, and that the messages "prompted discussions between
'excited and nervous managers' and the company's human resources
42
department." 1
What should a court do with such a case? One might say the answer
depends on whether the workplace should be a public forum for former
employees to vent their anger. Venting might disclose malfeasance, or
it might needlessly frighten people who in actuality have nothing to
worry about. However, this is a case in which the person who gets to
decide the question is more important than the decision in any particular
case. Whether a judge should decide depends on whether and to what
extent a manager's discretion over workplace communications policies
should be subject to judicial review.
E-mail is a means of
communication, and policies and practices pertaining to e-mail

139. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
103, 112 (1994) ("If you start from property rights, you can negotiate for free distribution; if you
start from an absence of property rights, it is very hard to get to the best solution when a charge is
optimal."); Hardy, Property,supra note 8, at 222 (explaining that the availability of a means for
limiting copying is not a "two way street"; specifically, it allows those who wish to restrict
copying to do so and it allows those who do not want to restrict copying not to do so, but the
"converse is not true").
140. Respondent/Plaintiff Intel Corporation's Answer Brief on the Merits, Intel Corp. v.
Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (No. S103781), 2002 WL 1926523, at *8 [hereinafter Intel
Response]. Hamidi's reply said only that this fact was irrelevant. Reply Brief on the Merits,
Hamidi (No. S103781), 2002 WL 1926520, at *10 n.7.
141. Intel Response, supra note 140, at *6 (quoting Hamidi's e-mail message).
142. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 301.
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constitute part of the communicative environment of the workplace.
Just as an employer who permits centerfolds to be tacked up on cubicle
walls creates a different environment from one who bans them, an
employer who limits employee e-mail use will create one sort of
environment, and an employer who does not will create another.
For this reason, the ability to control e-mail practices is an important
aspect of the employer's managerial authority over the workplace. If a
court defers to a manager's policies concerning the use of a firm's
network, the court leaves it to the firm to decide what expressive
environment is best suited to its particular workplace. That is the
ordinary legal approach to managerial decisions about the use of firm
resources, as evidenced by such deferential doctrines as the business
judgment rule. 143 As that rule implies, the law generally counts on
labor, product, and financial market competition to constrain managerial
discretion in such matters.
If the court limited Intel's discretion, that limitation alone would
affect the expressive environment at Intel. Judicial oversight of
managerial discretion alters in subtle but fundamental ways the social
relationships built on that discretion.
For example, suppose
employment termination decisions are treated as state actions, so that an
associate who objected to being made to write a brief a certain way
could bring a free speech claim if she were fired for her refusal. She
could then argue to a judge that she was right to insist on writing the
brief her way. Even if matters never reached that end game, adding
judicial review as a check on the partner's power to dictate the content
of briefs would turn every brief writing assignment into a potential
bargaining game. Work would suffer, while no First Amendment
values would be served. 144
Managerial discretion over the expressive environment of the
workplace is sometimes truncated to advance particular values. The
ethics rules prevent the associate from lying in the brief and give her
leverage to resist if the partner demands that she lie. 145 The hostile
workplace environment cause of action provides a closer analogy to the
general problem presented in Hamidi. An employer who would like to
encourage pin-ups and cat-calls at work will find himself in a

143.

See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAW 93-108 (1991) (arguing that courts need not actively police corporate decisions
because the market influences already serve the policing role).
144.

Cf. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 237 (1995).

145. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1, 3.3 (1999) (stating that a lawyer shall
not knowingly make a false statement).
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bargaining game with employees who demand reform, wielding Title
46
VII as leverage. 1
At least prior to Hamidi, the same was not true of a firm's policies
regarding communication equipment. Employers had discretion over
whether employees could use the Internet, whether to block access to
certain websites, or whether to block e-mails from certain persons, such
as Hamidi. Even after Hamidi, employers presumably retain the power
to regulate their employees' use of a network. 14 7 As we have seen, the
Hamidi opinion tries to duck the normative questions in the case,
producing the odd result that employers have the right to do these things
but that, at least with regard to blocking incoming e-mail, the law will
not help vindicate that right.
Not every court will be so enamored of formalism, however, so the
question of whether courts should pass judgment on a firm's
communication policies remains. Subjecting general communication
policies to judicial review would diminish employers' ability to tailor
the expressive environment to the particular job at hand. That would be
unfortunate, because different environments work better in different
contexts, and employers have better information about their workplaces
than do busy generalists like judges. Unlike judges, employers both
bear the costs of erroneous decisions and negotiate with employees
who, if they favor Hamidi-like spam, may demand that the employer
allow it.
Judicial incursion on managerial authority might be warranted if
there were significant free speech interests at stake, as Hamidi
argued, 14 8 but there are not. Doctrinally that argument is awkward.
The First Amendment gives speakers no right to subsidies or to use the
property of others. 149 Nor does the First Amendment create a general
free speech right within the workplace-not even for government
146. See, e.g., Miranda Oshige McGowan, Certain Illusions About Speech, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 391, 404 (2002) (describing elements of cause of action and cases interpreting them).
147. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 299 (noting that Intel "permits its employees to make reasonable
nonbusiness use of this system" (emphasis added)).
148. Opening Brief on the Merits, Hamidi (No. S103781), 2002 WL 1926521, at *43-47
(arguing that the injunction against him is a "state action that must comply with the free speech
guarantees of the California and United States Constitutions").
149. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998)
(concluding that a public television station did not violate the Constitution in excluding a thirdparty candidate from a televised debate); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974) (holding that a newspaper's refusal to print a letter to the editor did not violate the First
Amendment); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (determining that a shopping mall
had fight to prohibit distribution of handbills on mall property); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,
47-48 (1967) (opining that civil rights protestors did not have a right to protest on prison
property).
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employees. 15 ° Even if it did, those rights could be waived as a
condition of employment. 15 1 With such paltry free speech rights within
the employment relationship (none if the state action requirement is
taken seriously), it is hard to justify a right for non-employees to speak
within that relationship.
More fundamentally, there are good reasons why free speech rights
do not limit managerial discretion within the employment relationship.
Content regulation is both necessary and unobjectionable when the
purpose and social function of expression is to achieve something other
than the type of deliberation and debate the First Amendment tries to
152
foster.
Different expressive environments are constituted differently.
Regulations affect them in different ways. Not all workplaces are or
should be public forums. 15 3 Courts should not presume to the contrary
as a premise for extending into workplaces the free speech
jurisprudence of the street corner.
To the extent that any aspect of free speech theory is relevant to cases
such as Hamidi, it is that the First Amendment cares about the social
meaning of speech, which is the product of both the expressive conduct
at issue and the social contexts in which it occurs. 154 As noted at the
beginning of this Part, the right to exclude plays an important role in
constituting different expressive contexts. Thus, if anything, free
speech values weigh in favor of giving private parties discretion to form
different contexts that support a wide variety of expression. As we have
seen, that means such values weigh in favor of granting site owners the
right to exclude rather than in favor of a mandatory access rule.

150. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v. Unbehr, 518 U.S. 668,
673 (1996) (discussing the balancing test applied to speech claims by government employees and
extending test to independent contractors); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 813 (1985) (holding that a federal funding campaign was not a public forum,
and charity seeking to be included in the campaign could be rejected on grounds of workplace
efficiency); Sheppard v. Beerman, 317 F.3d 351, 352 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming summary
judgment rejecting First Amendment claim of a fired law clerk).
151. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 (1980) (holding a CIA agent liable for
breaching a contractual duty not to disclose information).
152. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996) (arguing that freespeech rights are limited within the managerial domains of the government).
153. McGowan, supra note 146, at 448.
154. David McGowan, From Social Friction to Social Meaning: What Expressive Uses of
Code Tell Us About Free Speech, 64 OHIO ST. L. (forthcoming December 2003).
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IV. THE CASE FOR CONSENT

The previous sections demonstrate that access cases present a
fundamental normative choice between property and liability rules.
This Part argues that website access is better governed by a property
rule than a liability rule. To justify this position, this Part examines the
case for open access.
A. Mandatory Open Access
One normative argument is that website owners should not be able to
bar users from websites, or portions of websites, because the website
owner chose to connect to the Internet. The fundamental premise of this
argument is that the Internet is a social domain constituted by a norm of
open access to the networks connected to it and to content or persons on
those networks. It is a commons. 155 To connect to the network is to
assent to that norm and place one's website in the commons. 15 6 A
related idea is that it is unfair for websites to free ride on the network
15 7
while withholding their content or bandwidth from network users.
For many thoughtful scholars who care deeply about the Internet, this
premise is an irreducible truth. It is a statement of what the Internet is,
and therefore how the law must treat it. 15 8 For now, I will merely point
out that there is nothing inherent in the Internet that makes this premise
true, just as there is nothing inherent in real property or chattels that
entitles an owner to an injunction. Whether the Internet will be
governed by open access is a choice.
The first thing to notice about the open access argument is that the
consent idea is just rhetoric. As applied to owners who agree to open
access, it is unnecessary. As applied to owners who disagree with open
access, it is a fiction. Whether it is a good fiction depends on how it is
used. Shedding the consent rhetoric allows us to focus on the premise
that the Internet is a commons. If that premise is accepted, the
argument is sound, and the cases we have examined are wrong.
155. See, e.g., Ken Hamidi, Ken Hamidi's Message, at http://www.faceintel.com/
hamidismessage.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2003) (describing the Internet as a public domain and
a commons, and suggesting that persons working for firms connected to the Internet were, to that
extent, "Netizens" rather than mere employees).
156. We saw a version of this argument rejected in CompuServe. See supra notes 36-53 and
accompanying text (explaining the CompuServe case).
157. See Burk, supra note 2, at 51 ("[P]ropertization in a networked environment encourages
the holder of the exclusive right to attempt to free ride upon the external benefits of the network,
while at-will avoiding contribution of such benefits to others.").
158. E.g., Burk, supra note 2, at 47-48 (arguing that public benefits of the Internet are
diminished by propertization); Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 171 ("[Tlhe high hopes raised by
cyberspace for changing the information landscape require open access.").
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The open access premise is flawed, however. It is too broad to
accommodate exclusions that obviously enhance welfare, and it
provides no basis for distinguishing among materially different cases. It
produces only a binary choice with extreme variance between the two
options: either you do not connect to the Internet at all, or everyone with
a connection may do what they want on your website.
For example, nothing in this argument justifies a rule allowing
owners to prevent access to their websites with passwords. Such
159
websites would free ride on the network as much as any other.
Indeed, nothing in this argument allows e-commerce sites to encrypt
personal financial information from customers. These implications are
disturbing, to say the least. The problem is that the commons argument
leans so heavily toward the interests of the community, it leaves no
room for those owners to decide for themselves how to structure access
to their website. The result is a conventional example of strong
160
communitarianism trumping private interests.
Having done away with password protection and privacy, we have
only physical harm to the network to consider. I will argue that a
website owner should not have to show harm to exclude others.
Because the prevailing academic critique of the trespass to chattels
doctrine has focused on physical harm, however, I consider here how
the commons view deals with harm.
Nothing in the open access argument provides a reason why a user
who causes harm to the computers that run a website should have to pay
for it. To the contrary, the argument supports, if it does not entail, a
privilege to use websites regardless of harm. If the computers become
part of a common by connecting to a common, by what logic does a
single private party have a right of action if the computers are harmed in
the common? Does physical harm to computers count just because the
Restatement says it counts? Is there no normative principle at issue?
I know of no one who actually defends this view, though neither do
critics of the trespass tort make any effort to distinguish on normative
grounds physical harm to computers from economic harm to a firm. To
the contrary, they criticize courts for taking economic harm into account
159. See Burk, supra note 2, at 47-51 (pointing out disparity when a site requires a password
but itself free rides on the network).
160. Cf. Amartya Sen, Personal Utilities and Public Judgments: Or What's Wrong with
Welfare Economics, 89 ECON. J. 537, 544-45 (1979) (arguing that only the ordinal properties of
the individual utility functions are to be used in social welfare judgments); Amartya Sen, The
Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 152 (1970) (stating that there is a
tension between supporters of the "majority decision" perspective and the concept of "individual
liberty").
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where physical harm is lacking. 16 1 Nevertheless, to take the argument
in its strongest form it is best to modify the premise of the open access
argument to take harm into account. The revised argument would rest
on the premise that the Internet is a social domain constituted by a norm
of open access to users and uses that do no harm to content and
networks connected to it. It is a commons subject to a harm principle.
To apply the argument to concrete cases, we now must define harm in a
way that explains why persons who cause it should bear its cost.
Defining harm is hard. The open access argument offers no way to
define it, and there is no neutral, objective baseline from which to
measure it. Instead, what counts as "harm" depends on baseline
entitlements of owners and users, which cannot be taken for granted in
defining harm. If one accepts the proposition that firms are entitled to
own their productive resources outright, free from unwanted use, then
the free riding of Cyber Promotions and Bidder's Edge count as harm.
One may reject that proposition, of course, but unless the only logic at
hand is the process of elimination, to reject one rule is not to supply an
argument in favor of another.
The open access argument provides no basis for distinguishing
between economic harm involving server crashes, which trespass to
chattel critics seem to regard as harm, and economic harm such as that
at issue in CompuServe or even the opportunity cost (under a property
rule) present in eBay. Normatively, the distinction makes no sense.
The risk of crashing relates inversely to site or network capacity.
Capacity is costly. Firms that spend money to build excess capacity,
and whose computers thus face only a low risk of crashing, will have
less control over their investment than firms with barely enough
capacity to get by; those firms could argue that unwanted use took up a
relatively high percentage of their available resources. In other words,
the notion that only crashing is harm gives weaker rights to firms that
have high costs than to those that have low costs, even though the highcost firms have a greater need to cover their costs, which the right to
162
exclude might help them do.
Against what I said in this section, it might be argued that the
implications I discuss are straw men. No one is actually trying to force
password-protected websites to open up or to disclose consumer

161. Burk, supra note 2, at 36. "The Restatement test clearly speaks in the first instance to the
impairment of the chattel" rather than a business run by the chattel. Id. (emphasis omitted).
162. It is not enough to say that only server crashing counts because only physical harm
supports a lawsuit. The normative question at hand is what kind of harm should support a
lawsuit.
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financial information. That is true, but the question is: Why not? If the
argument discussed in this section is sound, then it compels these
conclusions. That serious people shy away from these conclusions
suggests the argument is unsound.
B. Why the "Take the Bitter with the Sweet" PositionIs Unpersuasive
As a fallback from the open access argument, one might say
password-protected websites have chosen to remain "closed," and
therefore imply nothing about websites like eBay, which have chosen to

be "open." This idea implies that a website may be closed or open, and
it even may have some closed areas (as for storing financial
information) and open areas (as for shopping). But to the extent it is
open, it must be open to all. It cannot be open only to the persons or
163
uses the website owner favors.
This fallback position suffers from three flaws. The first is that it
cannot be justified by consent because its view of consent is a fiction. It
is true that password-protected websites have chosen to be "closed" and
eBay has chosen to be "open." It is also true that eBay has chosen to be
open subject to certain terms. Reasons must be given to disregard that
choice while respecting the choice of password-protected websites to
remain "closed."
Such reasons cannot be derived from utilitarian
analysis, which values bargaining because actual consent serves as a
proxy for the parties' view of the net welfare effects of transactions
among them. 164 It is inconsistent with utilitarian methodology to
substitute a fiction for the parties' expressed preferences.
163. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 170 (2001) ("No one forced eBay to open
itself to the World Wide Web. But if it did, it should live by the [open access] norm.").
164. This is also true of a related argument, which holds that in responding to queries,
hardware "consents" to the request and "gives" away the requested page. See Burk, supra note 2,
at 42; O'Rourke, Analogy, supra note 12, at 590. The Hamidi court made a particularly notable
mistake on this point when it said the "undisputed evidence revealed no actual or threatened
damage to Intel's computer hardware or software and no interference with its ordinary and
intended operation." Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 303 (Cal. 2003) (emphasis added). This
argument makes an error that disables utilitarian analysis. The automatic response of a piece of
hardware does not reflect anyone's perceptions of welfare in a particular case. It therefore cannot
measure welfare for purposes of utilitarian analysis of that case. In this regard, it is telling that
the Hamidi court made no effort to specify whose intentions it had in mind, nor why they
counted. It could not have meant Intel's intentions in the case at hand, because Intel wanted
Hamidi to stop sending messages to its network. It might have meant to refer to Intel's intentions
in general, but the court gave no reason why general intentions should trump Intel's intentions in
particular cases. Worse yet, the court might have meant to invoke the intentions of the firms that
built the hardware to support the idea that, in transmitting Hamidi's e-mails, the computers just
processed data, which is what they were built to do. That approach drives welfare analysis even
farther away from the case at hand, to the point where the identity and conduct of both parties is
essentially irrelevant.
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The second flaw is that to concede that owners may password-protect
websites is to concede that, at some level, the law should grant website
owners a right to exclude. Password protection is not the private
creation of a right; no protected website has bargained with all potential
users and obtained their agreement to keep closed. 165 The only
remaining question is whether the law should require password
protection as a condition of recognizing the right to exclude, or whether
it should recognize that right when "open" websites object to particular
uses. 166
167
We cannot measure precisely the welfare effects of these options.
We can say, however, that website owners have little or no incentive to
exclude uses that produce net benefits. 168 That is why, even after cases
like eBay, sites complain about not getting noticed rather than about
being browsed. 169 It is why they pay search engines to promote
them. 170 It is why, even though all but one court to face this issue
between 1997 and 2003 extended the trespass tort to allow owners to
regulate access to websites, 17 1 and even though the major search
engines can and do skip websites that ask to be skipped, 172 predictions
that giving websites a right to exclude would undermine the benefits of

165. In addition to which, if website owners do not have a right to exclude persons from their
websites, then they have no consideration to give in return for subscribers' payment. A person
who accesses a protected website without consent or payment has no contract. If they are to be
excluded-which they must be for bargaining to work generally-the law must recognize in the
website owner a right to exclude.
166. This implication is consistent with my earlier point that the state should enforce interests
it deems worthy of recognition when parties cannot enforce those interests themselves.
Otherwise, one's rights depend on such ethically trivial characteristics as physical strength or
hacking ability.
167. Regarding the measurement problem, see infra Part IV.C (describing how actual
measurements of the marginal utility effects of different legal rules are exceptionally difficult).
168. See infra Part IV.C (detailing the measurement problem specifically).
169. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 190 (worrying that trespass rights would "allow every
site owner to control the way its site is referred to and indexed" while acknowledging that "[miost
sites, however, are unlikely to exercise such a right since they are highly dependent on search
engines for reference").
I find the latter statement persuasive and believe it ameliorates
substantially the worry of the former.
170. See, e.g., GOOGLE, INC., GOOGLE ADVERTISING, at http://www.google.com/ads/
overview.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2003) (describing Google's "premium sponsorships"
program); see also John Markoff & G. Pascal Zachary, In Searching the Web, Google Finds
Riches, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13, 2003, § 3, at 1 (describing Google's revenue model), available at
LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
171. See cases cited supra note 11 (extending trespass to chattels doctrine). The exception
was Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal.
2000).
172. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text (noting that leading search engines will
respect standardized instructions posted on websites that limit automated browsing).
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electronic commerce have not been borne out. 17 3 None of the scholars
who warned of dire harm from extension to the trespass tort, and whose
work the Hamidi court cited, 17 4 pointed to any harm that such rulings
had caused in the several years in which courts had extended the tort.
Because real-world experience tends to falsify such conjectures, the
harms they predict should be discounted at a high rate. 175 The net
expected cost of recognizing a right to exclude for "open" websites is
therefore probably very low. 176 The only benefit from a rule requiring
websites to "close" as a condition of recognizing a right to exclude is
that the rule would avoid this expected cost. That means the gain (cost
173. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc., supra note 94, at 3-6
(stating the reasoning employed in that case "may have disastrous implications for basic types of
behavior fundamental to the Internet"). In deciding not to extend the trespass tort, the Hamidi
court cited predictions of harm in an amicus brief filed by many of the same intellectual property
professors who submitted a similar brief two years earlier in eBay. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d
296, 310-11 (Cal. 2003). These predictions seemed to be based on the premise that the lower
court ruling in Hamidi would require all users to obtain advance consent before any use of a site.
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc., supra note 94, at 12-13. The lower
court in Hamidi did not say that, however. Instead, it rejected the assertion that extending the
trespass tort implied that "every personal e-mail that an employee reads at work could constitute a
trespass." It held that "where the employer has told the sender the entry is unwanted and the
sender persists, the employer's petition for redress is proper." Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 244, 250 (Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added), rev'd, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). Nor did
precedent support such a position. The CompuServe court addressed the issue squarely and held
that consent could be presumed when an owner connected a server to the Internet, but that the
presumption could be rebutted by actual notice to a user. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1023-24 (S.D. Ohio 1997). Most of the cases following CompuServe
involve defendants who persisted in uses to which an owner objected even after the owner
notified the defendant of the objection, see Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No.
C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 WL 1736382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge,
Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548,
549 (E.D. Va. 1998), or in which the defendant does not deny'that it had notice of the policy it
violated, see Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Am.
Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (E.D. Va. 1998) (noting steps defendant
took to elude AOL filtering software). Finally, as Justice Mosk pointed out in his dissent in the
supreme court's Hamidi decision, the formalism of the trespass critique would allow a cause of
action if a computer were harmed even though a user would have no way of knowing in advance
whether the marginal effect of his or her use would be too much for the computer. Hamidi, 71
P.3d at 331 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Thus, the claim the amicus brief conceded could be made
presented the very risk of liability without notice that this argument decries.
174. Hamidi, 371 P.3d at 310-11.
175. Indeed, if critics of the trespass to chattels doctrine are willing to tolerate passwordprotected sites, they must explain why society should accept the risk that all sites will choose that
option, producing the harms they predict from cases such as eBay. I suspect the answer is that
everyone knows most websites will not choose that option. Owners go on the Internet to get
noticed; commercial websites make their living that way. They have no incentive to make it
harder for people to find them. The incentive to make access easy does not change if we allow
exclusion without password protection.
176. I say net costs because while excluding uses will always be a cost to the excluded user,
exclusion might produce a net social gain by avoiding the costs of the use.
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avoided) from such a rule would be low. The cost of such a rule would
be the sum of very small transaction costs spread over perhaps millions
of users. Each user would incur a small cost, in other words, to keep
out a free rider like Bidder's Edge. It is hard to estimate that sum, but it
is probably high relative to the small benefit of the rule. Utilitarian
177
analysis would reject the rule as wasteful.
Third and finally, "take the bitter with the sweet" statements are not
arguments. There is no logical difference between "If you want to
exclude people, then password protect" and "If you want tenure, vote
Republican." That is because neither statement has any analytical
content at all. Unless additional propositions explain why one must take
the bitter to get the sweet, and why imposition of the bitter is
normatively acceptable, such statements have no analytical value.
Without more, such statements are simply positions that, when adopted,
reflect only the power to adopt them.
Here, the power comes from the cost that sites would incur if the law
forces owners to make access for all users more costly in order to stop a
particular user like Hamidi or Bidder's Edge. If one assumes that use
relates inversely to the cost of use, such as remembering and entering
passwords, then the prospect of avoiding that cost would serve as
leverage in favor of open access if we adopted the "bitter with the
sweet" position as law. Requiring sites to password protect when they
would prefer to be open to most uses would limit the ability of site
owners to tailor access to the costs and benefits of particular uses. That
might benefit users, but it presumably makes site owners worse off, so it
would generate no predictions about net welfare without more precise
calculation. By limiting the parties' ability to align their estimates of
the welfare effects of their interactions, the relatively crude "bitter with
the sweet" rule would therefore probably produce lower net welfare
than a rule that left the parties freer to bargain over different uses.
C. A Simple UtilitarianPosition and Problems of Measurement
Rather than arguing for mandatory access as such, one might advance
a simple utilitarian position: The rule governing access should be the
rule that produces the greatest net welfare in society. If courts employ a
hedonic utilitarian approach, 17 8 they would not have to define harm;
177. See O'Rourke, Analogy, supra note 12, at 616 (noting (without necessarily endorsing)
the argument that "[riequiring a site to build a fence to keep out unwanted visitors is simply a
waste of resources").
178. See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 5-6 (Harvard
Law Sch. ed., 2003), for a distinction between a simple and hedonic utilitarian approach. For
Bentham's description of utility, see Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principlesof Morals
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rather, harm is whatever people experience as harm, and gains are
whatever they experience as gains.
Stated so abstractly, the utilitarian goal will not decide actual cases.
On the Internet, there are millions of different situations involving
millions of types of utility and disutility going on every minute. No one
has the data necessary to sum gains and losses from different rules,
certainly not busy generalists like judges. 179 One can think of particular
cases in which losses from an open access regime would exceed gains,
of course. If the open access rule extended to personal financial
information stored on e-commerce websites, the losses to society would
exceed the gains. There would be a quick burst of rampant theft,
followed by an enormous round of transaction costs to cancel and
reissue credit cards, followed by the collapse of such websites.
The problem lies in aligning that example with a normative principle
that justifies it. If we decide it would be ridiculous to extend the open
access norm to websites that pitch exempt offerings or to encrypted
financial data, then we know we should reject premises that compel
such results. We do not know from this analysis what premises to put in
their place. When it is used to justify the result, rather than as a step in
an argument, the statement, "Of course it's OK to encrypt and password
protect personal financial data, you fool," is the analytical equivalent of
"because."
Setting aside external ethical critiques, the problem of utilitarianism
is the problem of measurement. It is easy to employ the rational actor
assumption to support consequentialist conjectures. One might say that
granting website owners the right to exclude will produce an anticommons nightmare, or that granting users a right of access will
increase both allocative and dynamic efficiency. Theories are not
measurements, however, and they therefore do little to satisfy the
utilitarian requirement that costs and benefits be summed. Actual
measurements of the marginal utility effects of different legal rules are
exceptionally difficult. Problems in the real world must be solved using
presumptions and heuristics that relate human behavior to expected
welfare effects.

and Legislation, in JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 33-35 (Mary
Warnock ed., 1962).
179. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(disclaiming knowledge of marginal effects of rules); Easterbrook, supra note 139, at 104.
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D. The Casefor Consent

The case for consent rests on the presumption that bargaining over
resources produces results that more closely approximate the optimal
utilitarian regime than any other method of decision, such as litigation.
The underlying behavioral assumption is that persons act rationally; the
logical extension of that assumption as regards net welfare is the Coase
theorem. 180 The legal extension is that courts should favor property
rules where transaction costs are low and liability rules where they are
18 1
high.
Briefly, the argument is as follows: actions have both costs and
benefits, and rigorous analysis must consider both. The rational actor
assumption implies that if parties reach a voluntary and informed
bargain, then both parties are better off than they would have been
without the bargain.
On this account, if certain conditions are satisfied, such as that the
transaction is bilaterally voluntary and informed and occurs in a
reasonably competitive market, bargains provide a crude measure of the
182
sum of utility (though not the distribution of gains) in the transaction.
They therefore satisfy the utilitarian criterion better than top-down
consequentialist theorizing, which generates predictions rather than
even the very crude measurements derived from bargains. Conversely,
if persons in such circumstances can bargain but do not reach an
agreement, we may infer that the joint gains from trade were not enough
to leave each side better off. 183 That idea suggests courts might reduce
net welfare if they either compel dealing between parties who are able
to bargain but have not reached an agreement or allow one party to take
184
and use a resource, for which use the court will later try to fix a price.
These propositions support the general conclusion that bargains produce
higher expected net utility than compulsory dealing.

180. See COASE, FIRM, MARKET AND LAW, supra note 8, at 95 (arguing that in the absence of
transaction costs bargaining produces socially optimal results); COASE, STRUCTURE OF
PRODUCTION, supra note 8, at 10- 11.
181. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1092; see also Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10-14 (2002) (containing a survey of
recent related literature); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994) (arguing the proponents of liability rules in IP "carry a
heavy burden").
182. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 7 (1993); see also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 29-30 (1992).
183. EPSTEIN, supra note 123, at 219-20.
184. Id.
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Institutional considerations support this point as well. Contracting
places decisions in the hands of persons actually affected by bargains,
who have relatively good information and who bear the costs and reap
the benefits of the decisions. It aligns benefits and the costs necessary
to create them and internalizes at least some effects of different
behaviors. It avoids the uncertainty and cost of ex post facto damages
determinations by persons such as judges, who have less reliable
information than contracting parties and who do not bear the costs or
185
enjoy the gains of their decisions.
E. Why TraditionalArguments Against BargainingDo Not Undermine
the Casefor Consent
As an alternative to bargaining, one might favor a damages rule,
which would allow persons to use property without permission and
settle up through damages after the fact if they have caused enough
damage to make settling up worth the effort. 186 Such considerations
may persuade courts to modify even conventional trespass to land
doctrine into a quasi-nuisance regime, requiring a plaintiff to show
damages as a condition to obtaining relief. 187 The case for damages
leans heavily on defects that might render bargaining an unreliable
proxy for the welfare effects of certain actions.
A familiar argument against a property rule and in favor of a liability
rule is that transaction costs might preclude bargaining. 188 If bargaining
is too expensive, it makes no sense to rely on it to allocate resources.
Some scholars worry that recognizing property interests will lead to a
tragedy of the anti-commons, where there are so many conflicting

185. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1093 (providing a framework for
determining entitlements); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REv. 347, 350, 355-56 (1967); (comparing the ability of private and communal ownership to
internalize costs and benefits); Hardy, Property,supra note 8, at 231; James E. Krier & Stewart
M. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L.

REv. 440, 453-54 (1995) (containing a comparative institutional analysis); Merges, supra note
181, at 2655 (arguing that costs analysis from property law does not apply to intellectual property
rights).
186. See Demsetz, supra note 185, at 348-49; Krier & Schwab, supra note 185, at 453-54
(noting those who ignore uncertainty regarding damages yet acknowledge bargaining difficulties).
187. See Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 792 (Wash. 1985) (worrying that
giving all downwind homeowners a potential property rule as against a polluter would lead to
costly strategic negotiation, and therefore limiting potential recovery in tort to plaintiffs who had
suffered "actual and substantial damages"). The court in essence converted the property rule of
trespass into a liability rule because of the quite reasonable fear that transaction costs would
prevent the property rule from achieving an efficient result.
188. Burk, supra note 2, at 49 (citing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, Ill HARV. L. REv. 621 (1998)).
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property interests that transacting becomes too costly and breaks down,
189
with the result that nothing gets done.
There is no reason to believe transaction costs justify a damages rule
in the types of cases we have examined. None of those cases presents a
problem of prohibitive transaction costs. 190 In each of the cases save
Thrifty-Tel, bargaining was possible. In eBay, bargaining occurred. It
broke down not because transaction costs were too high, but because the
parties disagreed on the substantive terms. That is not market failure.
There is no reason to expect transaction costs to be prohibitively high
in such cases in the future. 19 1 As to human interactions, search costs
will be lower, and there will be no need to hunt for parking or wait in
line. 192 As to automated searches, "robots" may be instructed to obey
standardized instructions posted on websites, which give website

owners a way to limit automated browsing while allowing robots to
index hundreds of millions of webpages at a trivial cost. 19 3 The leading
search engines, Google, Yahoo!, and Alta Vista, respect such
instructions. 194 Internet technologists developed this protocol on their
own because they recognized its utility for themselves; it is not a
195
lawyers' scheme.
189. Id.
190. Cf. Bradley, 709 P.2d at 791 (modifying elements of the trespass cause of action to avoid
costly squabbling about smokestack emissions).
191. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2000); see also
Luis GARICANO & STEVEN N. KAPLAN, THE EFFECTS OF BUSINESS TO BUSINESS E-COMMERCE
ON TRANSACTION COSTS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8017, 2000)
(concluding the Internet offers potentially large efficiencies in the form of net reduction in
transaction costs); Hardy, Property, supra note 8, at 236-37; O'Rourke, Shaping Competition,
supra note 12, at 2004-05 (cautioning, however, that transaction costs might be more significant
than appears to be the case at first glance).
192. Verification costs on non-fungible goods, such as with clothing sizes, might be higher,
however.
193. See Martisin Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion, at http://www.robotstxt.org/
wc/norobots.html (last updated June 1994) (setting forth standards for robots).
194. See, e.g., ALTAVISTA Co., ADDING AND REMOVING URLS para. 16, at
http://addurl.altavista.com/help/search/faq-web#17 (last visited Sept. 27, 2003); GOOGLE, INC., I
NEED
MY
SITE
INFORMATION
REMOVED,
at
http://www.google.com/
webmasters/3.html#removed (last visited Sept. 27, 2003); YAHOO! INC., How DO I STOP
YAHOO! FROM CRAWLING MY WEB SITE FOR YAHOO! PRODUCT SEARCH?, at
http://help.yahoo.comlhelp/us/shop/shop-59.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2003) (describing process
for excluding sites from searches); see also GOOGLE, INC., GOOGLE TERMS OF SERVICE, at
http://www.google.comlterms-of-service.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2003) (prohibiting automatic
querying).
195. See Koster, supra note 193 (explaining that the standards were arrived at by a consensus
of those with an interest in robots). That search engines actually adhere to the robot exclusion
protocol calls into question the assertion that there is a norm of open access. Cf. LESSIG, supra
note 163, at 170 (explaining that the World Wide Web was created to provide open access to all
users). One could as well say there is a norm that users will respect instructions to skip a site, in
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For these reasons, generalized statements asserting that transaction
costs on the Internet are "high," or that recognizing a right to exclude at
the website level would create an anti-commons problem, should be
viewed skeptically. Actual practice contradicts them. 19 6 Scholars,
judges, and legislators should view with particular skepticism the idea
that search engines would suffer if the law required them to do what at
least the leader is doing already.
This point also applies to a particular type of transaction cost-the
holdout problem. The version of that problem relevant here occurs
when a project requires the cooperation of all concerned in order to
proceed. 19 7 The worry is that bargaining will break down because each
person will want to be the last to sign up in order to have the most
leverage to obtain a disproportionate share of the gains from the project
as a whole. 198 None of the trespass to chattel cases presents such a
problem because none of the cases requires unanimous or even general
cooperation regarding access to particular websites.
That is why access cases differ from particulates trespass cases, in
which the doctrines of trespass to land and nuisance have largely
merged. 19 9
Particulates cases involve a defendant "pushing"
particulates over a wide area with many potential plaintiffs. If each
plaintiff had a property right to stop any incursion, the defendant would
have to bargain with all potential parties to begin any operations. The
numbers of potential parties might be high. Because the consent of all
parties would be necessary, holdout problems would be severe. These
facts present a classic case for a liability rule because transaction costs
20 0
prevent bargaining.

which case the norms support owners such as eBay rather than norm-violating users such as
Bidder's Edge.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 180-184 (arguing that bargaining more closely
attains an optimal utilitarian regime).
197. See Burk, supra note 2, at 49 (mentioning the holdout problem as a potential risk). A
different version of the problem involves bilateral monopoly, which is not present in any case we
have considered. But see eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (coming closest to the problem but where bargaining had occurred).
198. EPSTEIN, supra note 123, at 133 (applying the laws of trespass to a detailed illustration of
"cattle trespass").
199. See supra note 113 (describing the convergence of trespass to land and nuisance
doctrines).
200. Demsetz, supra note 185, at 357. I say classic case because courts and academics tend to
favor a liability rule in this situation. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 185, at 450-5 1. By saying
this is the "classic" case, I do not mean to say it is a "conclusive" case. See id. at 454-55 (noting
that the preference for liability rules where transaction costs are high "[m]akes no sense" because
the same facts that impair bargaining impair damage valuations).

2003]

Website Access: The Case for Consent

In contrast, on the Internet, users make discrete choices to visit
particular websites. Websites deal bilaterally with individual users all
the time. Website interactions do not require unanimous or even
widespread consent; that is why eBay could reach agreements with
other search engines while refusing to consent to Bidder's Edge's
demands. 20 1 When users come to websites one at a time, the holdout
problem does not preclude bargaining. This point applies to search
engines as well. Leading search engines read robot.txt files and skip
websites that do not want to be searched. 20 2 This practice does not
prevent them from searching websites that welcome the publicity. The
prediction that individual exclusion of websites will create a search
Internet
engine anti-commons is at odds with current practice.
interactions present a different transaction cost structure than
smokestack pollution or broadcasting or the distribution of
electricity, 20 3 and the difference in transaction costs justifies different
rules.
A different objection is that if transaction costs are so low, then the
20 4
difference between property and liability rules does not matter.
Critics of the trespass doctrine have not raised this argument, but there
is something to it. In the extreme case of zero transaction costs, the
Coase Theorem suggests the choice of rule does not matter. 20 5 I have
said only that costs are low, however, not that they are zero. Holdout
problems would be severe if all concerned tried to create property rights
so it is better to assign them to the owner
through collective bargaining,
20 6
in the first instance.
In addition, even very low transaction costs do not imply that
litigation approximates the social optimum as well as bargaining.
Judges get their information from parties, so in virtually all cases they
cannot have better information about a party's situation than the party
itself. A judge might synthesize information to get a clearer picture of
the whole situation than either party has, but that is very unlikely.
Neither party has an incentive to tell the unvarnished truth. Instead,
parties spin their stories through lawyers, who might not understand the
facts very well to begin with, and who are in any event trying to win. It
201. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062, 1068.
202. See supra notes 193-94 (describing how sites can be excluded from searching).
203. Burk, supra note 2, at 34 (illustrating situations of "trespass by electrons").
204. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 185, at 448, 455 (noting irrelevance of initial
assignment of rights when transaction costs are zero).
205. See COASE, FIRM, MARKET AND LAW, supra note 8, passim.
206. Krier & Schwab, supra note 185, at 449. As noted earlier, this is what courts actually
tend to do.
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follows that, most of the time, judges will have7 much worse information
20
than either party or both parties put together.
For these reasons, to the extent judges interject themselves into the
substance of bargaining, they will tend to lessen the degree to which
bargaining reflects the parties' estimates of the costs and benefits of
uses. That is a cost that counts in utilitarian analysis. While judges can
do some good, these considerations justify skepticism regarding judicial
intervention.
A different objection puts judges in a slightly better light. It is that
bargaining will not achieve optimal results because it will not account
for the value of positive (network) externalities. 20 8 At the network
level, the social value of the Internet increases with the number of
persons who use it and post content on it. 20 9
Network-wide
coordination is necessary on some issues, such as communication
protocols. 2 10 Access to particular content on particular websites is not
2 11
one of those issues, however.
In some data harvesting cases, there probably are positive effects the
parties cannot internalize. The nature and magnitude of those effects
depend on how the data are used. The cases to date do not show that the
externality concern justifies a damages rule, however. As noted earlier,
owners, especially retailers and auctioneers, go on the Internet in the
first place to take advantage of the lower search and transaction costs it
offers. That is why they pay search engines to sponsor links or "bias"
results. 2 12 Owners have every incentive to invite browsing that
207. See generally STEVEN GILLERS, THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS 404-05 (6th ed. 2002)
(excerpting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 11-19 (1980)). Frankel says that, in
litigation,
the deciders, though commissioned to discover the truth, are passive recipients, not
active explorers. They take what they are given. They consider the questions raised by

counsel, rarely any others.... The judges and jurors almost never make any inquiries
on their own, and are not staffed or otherwise equipped to do so. The reconstructions
of the past to be given in the courtroom are likely to be the sharply divergent stories
told by partisans, divergent from each other and from the actual events supposed to be
portrayed.
Id.at 405 (quoting Frankel).
208. The reason is that, where parties to bargaining cannot capture all the value created by the
bargain, they will have too little incentive to bargain. Thus, net utility might be higher under a
regime of compulsory access than under a regime of bargaining.
209. Burk, supra note 2, at 48 (arguing against over-propertization of the Internet).
210. See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 778 (2003) (containing an excellent overview).
211. See O'Rourke, Analogy, supra note 12, at 616 (discussing the difference between access
to the network itself and access to individual cites).
212. Michael D. Smith, The Impact of Shopbots on Electronic Markets 5 (Sept. 2002) (noting
that "[iun late 2000 and early 2001 most shopbots migrated to biased listings where retailers can
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produces net gains. 213 The expected cost of a property rule is therefore
low.
Professor O'Rourke argues that websites might refuse to be browsed
2 14
to preserve market power or for other socially undesirable reasons.
At first glance it seems odd that a website would try to preserve market
power by decreasing traffic to the site, thus lowering the number of
transactions in which it could engage. Professor O'Rourke suggests,
however, that brand loyalty or other factors might cause consumers to
forgo comparison shopping, even though comparison shopping on the
Internet is relatively cheap even in the presence of some market power.
If that is the case, a site might have an interest in keeping its prices off
on which consumers could more readily compare
aggregator websites,
2 15
firms.
across
prices
As with the transaction cost argument, there is in theory a case in
which this objection could be true. Market power implies that a firm
could charge prices above the competitive level. If it were doing so,
that might give it a reason to avoid dispersion of its prices, so long as
the gains from sales at prices above the competitive level exceeded
find the website.
losses from sales not made because consumers did not
2 16
I do not know how often that will be the case, if ever.
Of the cases to date, only eBay involves a site with a plausible claim
to market power, and there was no evidence that eBay tried to leverage
that power in welfare-reducing ways. 2 17 eBay did not object to realtime queries by Bidder's Edge, only to that firm's practice of
maintaining its own database of eBay auctions, which would tend to lag

pay a fee for priority positioning"), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/-mds/isem.pdf
(last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
213. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 169-170 ("If you are not listed in the search results you
are almost nonexistent on the web."); O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 2004
("Because a site generally has an incentive to attract the maximum number of customers, its
policy toward indexing must reflect that which is efficient both for it and its customers."). eBay
illustrates this point. eBay licensed other auction aggregators but reached an impasse with
Bidder's Edge because it worried that Bidder's Edge's browsing method would cause it to post
outdated data. EBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
214. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 1978-79 (illustrating a reason to
refuse browsing capability).
215. Id. If brand loyalty is actually that strong, I am not sure why consumers would bother
with aggregator websites, but it is certainly possible that they might.
216. But see id. at 2005 (pointing out that there are socially desirable reasons a site might

object to use).
217. Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 166-67 (noting eBay's alternate reasons for seeking
protection against Bidder's Edge).
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actual bidding on eBay. 2 18 eBay apparently worried that old bid data
would mislead consumers by understating the interest the market
showed in items listed on eBay. 2 19 If one accepts the premise that
"bidding begets bids," 220 this concern was rational. Gains to Bidder's
Edge might have been losses both to consumers, who missed auctions
they would have visited if their information had been current, 22 1 and to
eBay sellers, whose sale prices would be lower than if buyers had
current information. (Unlike Bidder's Edge, which reported on auctions
others hosted but which did not host auctions itself, eBay had to worry
about the welfare of sellers as well as buyers.) Because eBay charges a
222
fraction of the sales price, it would bear costs, too.
F. Why Consent Should Prevailas the Default Rule
Because the actual cases provide no support for these theoretical

objections to bargaining, the objections do not undermine the case for
consent. There have been many predictions that applying trespass
theory to websites would produce great harm. Some of these theories,
such as the holdout concern, have no logical basis. Those that do have a

logical basis face a factual problem: trespass theory has been applied in
218. Professor Elkin-Koren suggests eBay might have resisted browsing to maintain "its
control over the community of users that occupies its site since ...[with crawling, users] will no
longer be captured and restricted to a single site." Id. at 167. No evidence in the case suggested
such capture; eBay's offer to license Bidder's Edge if Bidder's Edge would agree to real-term
querying and eBay's actual licensing of other aggregators contradict this thesis. eBay, 100 F.
Supp. 2d at 1062, 1068.
219. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
220. See William B. Shaw, Alt.Marketing.Online.eBayFAQ para. 3.1.7, at http://
www.faqs.org/faqs/business/online-marketing/ebay/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2003) (explaining
auctioning strategies). The posting explains that:
Many sellers believe that reserves reduce the number of bidders and hurt your final fee.
Other sellers believe the opposite-by starting an auction with a low price and a
reasonable reserve, you will attract early bidding and bidders will gravitate to your
auction (i.e. bids beget bids). You'll have to experiment a bit to see what works for
you.
Id.
221. It would be very hard for consumers to discount accurately the information they found on
Bidder's Edge. The difference between the results in Bidder's Edge's database and actual
bidding would depend on how often Bidder's Edge queried eBay and how much bidding occurred
in between those queries. Bidder's Edge might have disclosed the first variable, though there is
no evidence that it did; it could not have disclosed the second.
222. See O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 1983-84 (discussing relationship
between profit sites and indexes). Professor O'Rourke questions the staleness argument, noting
that firms now live with information that might become stale, as with advertised prices in
monthly magazines. Id. at 1979 n.59. That would not be true of auctions, in which prices are set
in real time, however, and which constitute a bidding process rather than an invitation to bid.
Though we have lived with stale information in the past, it would be desirable to have fresher
information in the future.
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223
several cases spanning several years, and the harm has not occurred.
Utilitarianism requires that predictions be discounted to reflect their
probabilities; the expected cost of these predicted harms is very low.
Even if the expected cost were higher, however, such predictions
make no affirmative case for some rule other than access. All markets
fall short of conditions needed for perfect competition. 224 To show that
markets for website access do, too, does no more than place them within
the set of all markets. Being part of the set of all markets provides no
basis for treating markets for access differently from any other markets.
Unless there is a general reason to believe that judicial determinations
approximate the socially optimal result better than bargaining, then
these objections do not make any comparative point at all, much less an
affirmative case for some other rule, such as nuisance.
One way or another, it is an affirmative, comparative point that needs
to be made. Owners might have sub-optimal incentives, but their
information and incentives still might produce results closer to the
social optimum than the information and incentives of judges. Factors
that reduce confidence in bargaining tend to reduce confidence in
judicial valuation as well. 225 Because judges have systematically worse
information than parties, which makes their utility calculations less
reliable to begin with, even increasing transaction costs may not narrow
the gap between bargaining and litigation very much. At a minimum, it
is very hard to choose in the abstract. Contextual analysis is necessary,
which is one reason I emphasize the facts of the cases rather than
hypothetical risks.
Professor O'Rourke rightly says that the real question is "on which
side of the coin-strong or weak property rights-should the law err at
the beginning stages of a new technology? ' 2 26 Professor O'Rourke
believes this is a tough call, but that "because we know so little about
the direction in which technology will develop and because incentives
are not always aligned optimally to ensure efficient licensing, a cautious

223. See supra text accompanying notes 180-184 (arguing that bargaining more closely
attains the optimal utilitarian regime).
224. See O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 1967-68 (discussing why most
markets are not perfectly competitive).
225. Krier & Schwab, supra note 185, at 453-54. Professor Polinsky made this point early
on. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive
and Damages Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075, 1080 (1980) (arguing that liability rules are not

generally preferable where courts have imperfect information).
226. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 2005; see also Burk, supra note 2, at
53 (advocating "muddy" property rules).
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approach to property rights may be appropriate." 22 7 For both Professor
O'Rourke and Professor Burk, these facts make a nuisance rule or other
"weak" entitlement, in which judges may balance social costs and
2 28
benefits, preferable to the strong property rule injunctions imply.
These arguments make a persuasive case that judges should worry
about their imperfect information and the risk of unintended
consequences from their decisions and should proceed cautiously in
establishing access rules. 229 A property rule is superior to other rules
for precisely those reasons. Adopting a rule of consent is the most
prudent decision judges can make because it poses the lowest risk and
cost of error, and because it allows the greatest degree of selfdetermination among sites.
On the first point, as demonstrated in Part III, if a site wishes to leave
itself open to the public, it is free to do so. A rule of consent does it no
harm. If a website wishes to close itself, however, either in whole or in
part, then a rule of general access will prevent it from doing so. 2 30 No
website would be able to bargain with all potential users for consent
allowing it to close. Granting the right is better than either mandatory
access or balancing, because it will not be used if it is not needed, and if
it is needed it cannot be privately created.
On the second point, if one concedes that some websites in some
circumstances should be allowed to limit access, then the only real
question is who decides when closure is good. Bargaining is the best
bet. The lack of information about welfare effects, which plagues
scholars (who may contemplate such things at their leisure), plagues
judges too. 23 1 The parties' information is better. There is no good
reason to believe that, in the general run of cases, private incentives are
227. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 2005 (arguing against giving
technological development control to few firms).
228. Burk, supra note 2, at 53 (advocating the application of nuisance law); O'Rourke,
Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 2001-03 (discussing nuisance law as applied to the issue
of "spiders" access).
229. That case is even stronger when one considers that over 171 million IP addresses have

been assigned

a name.

INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM,

INTERNET DOMAIN SURVEY

BACKGROUND, at http://www.isc.org/ds/WWW-200301/index.html (January 2003). Also, there
are over one billion publicly available web pages. Froomkin, supra note 210, at 782. The
variance in the social functions of these sites is probably quite high.
230. Hardy, Property, supra note 8, at 222; see also Easterbook, supra note 139, at 112
(pointing out reasons why property rights are not always protected by owners).
231. Judge Whyte offered a commendably candid comment on this point in eBay. In
discussing the requirement that he consider the public interest in granting injunctive relief, he said
"[tihe court. . . recognizes that it is poorly suited to determine what balance between encouraging
the exchange of information, and preserving economic incentives to create, will maximize the
public good." eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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so poorly aligned with social welfare that judges can do better than
2 32
bargaining.
Even if one just cannot help trusting judges more than parties,
however, there is a real social cost to empowering judges to re-weigh
decisions about workplace expression that are currently within the
domain of managerial discretion. 2 33 In the best case, managers whose
discretion was limited by the possibility of a judicial re-weighing of
access decisions would find it harder to constitute the expressive
workplace environment they feel is best suited to their particular job. In
the worst case, judges would find they are no better at judging the
substantive merit of e-mail messages than they were at defining
obscenity and would adopt an "anything goes" posture that would
homogenize at the least common denominator that portion of the
expressive workplace environment that connected to the Internet.
G. Possible Exceptions to the Consent Default
No legal rule is absolute, and this Article does not advocate an
absolute rule to govern website access. Injunctions should be a strong
default rule, but departures could be justified by theory and evidence
showing that some other rule optimizes social welfare better than
bargaining. In particular, because we are working within utilitarianism,
if courts can identify a set of cases where a liability rule or use privilege
creates greater net welfare than bargaining, then that set of cases should
be governed by such a rule. 234 Like the transaction cost arguments,
however, this qualification states only a theoretical point. None of the
cases analyzed previously justify a preference for judicial resource
allocation over bargaining.
In analyzing claims for exceptions, courts should distinguish the
"pushing" of data through a network, as in the spam cases, from the

232. Professor Epstein rightly describes the open-access view as equivalent to a compulsory
license and, also rightly, says, "[n]o compulsory license scheme, even with compensation, could
hope to match the level of particularization and standardization achieved by contract." Epstein,
supra note 8, at 84.
233. A related point is that the more willing judges are to intervene when parties find it hard
to bargain, the less incentive parties have to develop bargaining mechanisms and other ways of
taking advantage of their superior information. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 185, at 464.
Because there are always some bargaining imperfections, in the extreme case the position that

imperfections justify intervention has judges setting all prices.
234. Copyright cases privileging parodies under the fair use doctrine provide an analogue
here. E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (holding that 2 Live
Crew's commercial parody could be protected by the fair use doctrine); Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (holding aggressive parody of Gone With
the Wind protected by fair use doctrine). My thanks to Larry Lessig for emphasizing this point.
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"pulling" of data from a website, as in eBay.2 35 In the former cases, the
parties are in a good position to internalize most of the costs and
benefits of use. Therefore, courts should view with great skepticism
claims that welfare would be enhanced through a compelled right of
access to "push" data through a network. Externalities might be a
greater problem in "pull" cases, depending on how harvested data are
used. No such case to date presents a plausible claim that judges could
approximate the optimal result better than bargaining, but if a wellreasoned and well-documented case could be made, it would be a
mistake to dismiss it out of reflexive deference to bargaining.
Finally, courts should take seriously the consent default and the
notice requirement to qualify or revoke consent. Owners should be
required to use the means best suited to particular uses and be clear
about the terms they impose.
Plaintiffs should be required to
demonstrate that use was not consensual, which means they should bear
the burden of showing that they notified the defendant that its use was
nonconsensual.
V. CONCLUSION

Courts in website and network access cases have expanded the
doctrine of trespass to chattels because existing law recognizes an
interest in the inviolable possession of chattels that is being violated in
cases where self-help fails. By modifying the doctrine, these courts
have replicated the results the Restatement expected the law to achieve.
The criticism of these decisions, which holds implicitly that the results
may change but the doctrine must remain the same, rests on a formalism
that has not been adequately defended and which I believe is not
defensible.
Granting website and network owners the right to exclude allows
them to constitute a wide variety of different social environments.
Adopting a rule of mandatory access impairs this ability. The risk and
costs of error are greater in the latter case, because a website that has a
right to exclude need not use it, while one that needs it but does not
have it will not be able to replicate it through bargaining. It is better to
have a right and not need it, than to need a right and not have it.
In addition, the owner's discretion plays an important role in
constituting and managing these expressive environments. Negating or
limiting that discretion, as by judicial review under a nuisance theory,
will affect these environments regardless of the results of particular
235. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (comparing and contrasting "pull,"
versus "push" websites).
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decisions.
Simply moving control over such resources from the
managerial domain to the more ambiguous domain of judicial review
will interfere with the social processes through which environments are
constituted.
The argument for open access fails because excluding users from
sites enhances welfare in at least some cases. Neither the open access
argument nor the more modest "bitter with the sweet" position provides
any basis to distinguish socially desirable from undesirable exclusions.
The only question in these cases is whether bargaining or judicial
review should govern access. The case for bargaining is stronger and
should prevail as the default rule.

